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ARTICLES
SOVEREIGNTY, NOT DUE PROCESS: PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT ALIEN
DEFENDANTS

Austen L. Parrish*

The Due Process Clause, with its focus on a defendant's liberty
interest, has become the key, if not only, limitation on a court's
exercise of personal jurisdiction.
This due process
jurisdictional limitation is universally assumed to apply with
equal force to alien defendants as to domestic defendants. With
few exceptions, scholars do not distinguish between the two.
Neither do the courts.
"Countless cases assume that
[foreigners] have all the rights of U.S. citizens to object to
extraterritorialassertions of personaljurisdiction."'

* Associate Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law.
J.D., Columbia University, 1997; B.A., University of Washington, 1994. The
author is the Director of Southwestern's Summer Law Program in Vancouver,
B.C., Canada, where he teaches International Environmental Law at the
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Anahid Gharakhanian, Robert E. Lutz, Ashley Parrish, Kal Raustiala, and
Dennis T. Yokoyama for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts, and to
Linda Silberman for her guidance in explaining the Hague Convention's status.
Special thanks to Day Hadaegh and Tiffany Hung for their research assistance.
1. Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358, 1362
(7th Cir. 1985), abrogatedon othergrounds by Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499
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But is this assumption sound? This Article explores the
uncritical assumption that the same due process considerations
apply to alien defendants as to domestic defendants in the
personal jurisdiction context. It concludes that the current
approach to personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants is
doctrinally inconsistent with broader notions of American
constitutionalism. The inconsistency is particularlystark given
recent Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, including those cases
involving Guantdnamo Bay detainees. The limits on a court's
power to assert extraterritorialpersonaljurisdiction over alien
defendants derive not from the Due Process Clause, as
commonly assumed, but from the inherent attributes of
sovereignty under internationallaw. The Article concludes by
suggesting two frameworks for determining when a court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, alien
defendant. For theoretical coherence and pragmatic reasons,
the Court should untether the personal jurisdiction analysis
from the Constitution in internationalcases. Sovereignty, not
due process, limits a U.S. court's extraterritorialassertion of
personaljurisdiction.
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"[Hiow long soever it hath continued, if it be againstreason,
it is of no force in law."
- Sir Edward Coke
I.

INTRODUCTION

Academics often lament the current law of personal jurisdiction
as incoherent and convoluted.3 But in some ways, the law limiting a
court's extraterritorial assertion of personal jurisdiction is settled.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not taken a personal jurisdiction case
for over fifteen years.4 And despite any shortcomings, the law is
"sufficiently clear to permit expeditious resolution of jurisdictional
issues in most cases."5 Due process requires that a defendant "not
present within the territory of the forum,.. . have certain minimum
contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the

2.

1

EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF

§ 80 (Garland Publishing 1979) (1628).
3. For some recent examples, see Robert J. Condlin, "Defendant Veto" or
"Totality of the Circumstances"? It's Time for the Supreme Court to Straighten
out the PersonalJurisdictionStandard Once Again, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 53, 53
(2004) ("Commentators frequently claim that there is no single, coherent
doctrine of extra-territorial personal jurisdiction, and unfortunately, they are
correct." (footnote omitted)); Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum
Contacts: Toward a Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189,
189 (1998) (noting that "[aimbiguity and incoherence have plagued the
minimum contacts test"); James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins
of Judicial Jurisdiction:Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169,
171 (2004) (explaining that "[a]lthough the extensive body of commentary on
federally imposed limitations of state court jurisdiction agrees on very little, the
one point of consensus is that Supreme Court personal jurisdiction doctrine is
deeply confused").
But see Richard K. Greenstein, The Nature of Legal
Argument: The Personal Jurisdiction Paradigm, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 855, 856
(1987) (arguing that "[tihe doctrine of personal jurisdiction is ...consistent and
coherent"); Earl M. Maltz, Unraveling the Conundrum of the Law of Personal
Jurisdiction:A Comment on Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of
California, 1987 DUKE L.J. 669, 670 ("Rejecting the claim that the Supreme
Court's approach to personal jurisdiction is incoherent, . . .[and] argu[ing] that
the decisional pattern of personal jurisdiction cases is the product of the
interaction of a number of perfectly understandable conceptions of fairness held
by individual Justices.").
4. The last significant Supreme Court case addressing personal
jurisdiction was Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
5. Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdictionover Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69
VA. L. REV. 85, 108 (1983); see also Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial
Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 4 (1987)
("Despite these criticisms, InternationalShoe's minimum contacts test generally
appears to function adequately in interstate cases."); Lilly, supra, at 107 (noting
that despite uncertainties in personal jurisdiction law, those "uncertainties are
not of great practical significance").
ENGLAND
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suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."'6 In at least one respect, the doctrinal formulation is thus
unmistakable: due process is the starting and ending point to any
personal jurisdiction analysis.7 As the U.S. Supreme Court has
expressly said, the Due Process Clause" is the sole limitation on a
state's power to subject an out-of-state defendant to the personal
jurisdiction of its courts.9
This focus on the Due Process Clause, and the jurisdictional
principles derived from it, is universally assumed appropriate
whether the case involves a domestic or a foreign defendant. ° With
few exceptions, scholars do not distinguish between the two."
Neither do the courts. 12 "Countless cases assume that foreign
6. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).

7. See Linda S. Mullenix, Class Actions, Personal Jurisdiction, and
Plaintiffs' Due Process: Implications for Mass Tort Litigation, 28 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 871, 887 (1995) ("[P]ersonal jurisdiction jurisprudence has, for fifty years,
... exclusively focused on defendants' due process concerns."); see also infra
notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
8. When a court's jurisdiction is based on a state statute or common law,

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is implicated.

U.S.

CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. If a federal jurisdictional statute is involved, the Fifth

Amendment provides the Due Process limitation. Id. at amend. V.
9. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
703 n.10 (1982); see also KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE: TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 21-23 (1999) (reviewing sources of personal
jurisdiction law and concluding that "the only significant external restriction on
states' territorial authority to adjudicate lies in the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause").
10. The term "alien" is used to refer to either: (1) a person who is not a U.S.
resident or (2) a corporation incorporated in a foreign country.

11. See, e.g., Edward B. Adams, Jr., Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Parties, in INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: DEFENDING AND SUING FOREIGN PARTIES

IN U.S. FEDERAL COURTS 113, 114 (David J. Levy ed., 2003) (noting that the
same standards apply for "personal jurisdiction over a non-resident or foreign
defendant"); cf FED. R. CrV. P. 4, 1993 advisory committee's note (explaining
that "[t]here remain constitutional limitations on the exercise of territorial
jurisdiction by federal courts over persons outside the United States");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

§ 421, reporter's notes 2, 7

(1987) (excepting availability of nationwide jurisdiction and not distinguishing
between foreign and domestic defendants).
12. See Karen Halverson, Is a Foreign State a "Person"?Does it Matter?:

PersonalJurisdiction,Due Process, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 115, 135-36 (2001) (stating that under "the
'minimum contacts' test . . . it is well settled that foreign corporations are
entitled to due process" but noting that the Supreme Court has not "explicitly
address[ed] the threshold question of whether a foreign corporation is entitled
to due process"); Gary A. Haugen, PersonalJurisdictionand Due ProcessRights
for Alien Defendants, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 109, 110 (1993) (describing how the
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companies have all the rights of U.S. citizens to object to
extraterritorial assertions of personal jurisdiction.""
The
assumption-now firmly entrenched-is that the personal
jurisdiction standards for domestic defendants and nonresident,
alien defendants are the same. But is this assumption sound?
This question-whether the jurisdictional standard developed
for domestic defendants from "foreign states" appropriately applies
to alien defendants from "foreign nations"--is not academic;
jurisdictional rules can have profound implications. First, litigation
in the United States routinely features foreign defendants. The
number of suits against nonresident alien defendants over recent
years has steadily increased, and international class actions have
become a common phenomenon. 14 The proliferation of transnational
activity and globalization means that this increasing trend will
doubtlessly continue. 15 The Internet's tremendous growth also
contributes to transnational litigation, as U.S. citizens and aliens
increasingly interact even when the alien has no physical contact
with the United States. 6
Second, the impact of U.S. courts
accepting jurisdiction can be acutely felt in the foreign affairs arena.
U.S. courts broadly asserting jurisdiction can negatively impact
foreign, diplomatic, and trade relations. The jurisdictional inquiry
also impacts judgment enforcement. While some countries have
recently shown a greater willingness to recognize U.S. judgments
courts treat the Due Process Clause's jurisdictional protections as "apply[ing] to
alien defendants in the same way they apply to domestic defendants").
13. Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A. 772 F.2d 1358, 1362
(7th Cir. 1985), abrogatedon othergrounds by Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499
U.S. 225 (1991).
14. See infra notes 211-12 and Part IV.A.1.
15. See Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction
Over and Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 HASTINGS
L.J. 799, 799-800 (1988) (describing the increase in transnational litigation);
Haugen, supra note 12, at 110 (discussing global integration and the "rapidly
expanding system of transnational activity").
Even in the early 1980s,
commentators noted that "[tihe flourishing activity of international commerce
has resulted in increased numbers of claims against alien defendants brought
in American courts." Lilly, supra note 5, at 116. See generally infra Part IV.A.I.
16. For an extensive discussion of the Internet and globalization, see Paul
Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction,151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (2002).
For discussions of the personal jurisdiction analysis in domestic Internet cases,
see Katherine C. Sheehan, Predictingthe Future: PersonalJurisdictionfor the
Twenty-First Century, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 385 (1998) and Dennis T. Yokoyama,
You Can't Always Use the Zippo Code: The Fallacy of a Uniform Theory of
InternetPersonal Jurisdiction,54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1147 (2005).
17. Born, supra note 5, at 28-29 (describing the ways that "assertions of
jurisdiction over foreigners can affect United States foreign relations in ways
that domestic claims of jurisdiction cannot").
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abroad, most countries refuse to recognize U.S. judgments based on
what they perceive to be exorbitant jurisdictional assertions. 8
Third, the current jurisdictional jurisprudence constrains the
United States when attempting to reach agreement on international
jurisdictional and judgment treaties. The failure of the now defunct
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Satisfaction of Judgments
has been ascribed to the breadth of U.S. jurisdictional rules as
applied to foreigners.' 9
These implications alone justify reexamining the doctrinal bases
underlying the limits of a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction
over alien defendants. An examination is particularly timely,
however, for another reason. Given the Supreme Court's fifteenyear hiatus from granting certiorari on a personal jurisdiction case, 20
scholars predict that "the Supreme Court is about to get back into
the personal jurisdiction business."2' When the Supreme Court does
address the issue again, its 'decision will hopefully clarify and lend
coherence to personal jurisdiction law rather than ignore, or even
worse contribute to, the disarray. And even if the Supreme Court
does not decide a case soon, jurisdictional limits over nonresident
aliens will be reexamined in light of the American Law Institute's
soon-to-be proposed federal statute on the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments.22
Surprisingly given the
relevance and importance of the issue and despite the overwhelming

18. See infra Part IV.A.2 (describing foreign nations' willingness to
recognize U.S. judgments). See generally Comm. on Foreign & Comparative
Law, Survey on Foreign Recognition of U.S. Money Judgments, 56 REC. OF THE
AsS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 378 (2001) (surveying foreign
approaches to U.S. judgment recognition and enforcement).
19. See infra Part IV.A.2.
20. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). Although Burnham
was decided most recently, it has been over twenty years since the Court's last
major discussion of the "minimum contacts" standard. Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-78 (1985); Condlin, supra note 3, at 100.
Coincidentally, approximately twenty years had passed since the Court's last
hiatus from addressing the law of personal jurisdiction. When the Supreme
Court decided Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), and the series of cases
that followed, it was reentering an area it had not trodden since 1958 with
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). See generally Martin H. Redish, Due
Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction:A Theoretical Evaluation, 75
Nw. U. L. REV. 1112, 1112 (1981) (noting the "flurry of activity" after a twentyyear hiatus from giving "extensive consideration to the theoretical and practical
problems that arise in the law of personal jurisdiction").
21. Condlin, supra note 3, at 56.
22. See

AMERICAN LAW INST., RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN

JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE

2005).

(Proposed Final Draft
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amount of commentary on personal jurisdiction in general,23 a
dearth of scholarship exists addressing personal jurisdiction over
alien defendants.24 This Article attempts to fill this scholarship gap.
This Article argues that the assumption that the same due
process considerations apply equally to nonresident, alien
defendants as to domestic defendants in the personal jurisdiction
context is doctrinally inconsistent with broader notions of American
constitutionalism. This Article does three things. Part II traces the
history of personal jurisdiction law. Without retelling for "the
thousandth time the history of in personam jurisdiction, 2 5 it
explains a conceptual evolution: the demise of territorial sovereignty
and the rise of due process as the only meaningful limitation on the
extraterritorial assertion of personal jurisdiction. Part II ends by
explaining how courts have contributed to this evolution by focusing
on the defendant's individual liberty interests even when the case
Part III explores the
involves nonresident, alien defendants.
relationship between due process and personal jurisdiction in cases
involving foreign defendants. It concludes that nonresident, alien
defendants do not have due process rights under the Fourteenth and
Fifth Amendments and that, contrary to conventional wisdom,
sovereignty principles are what limit a court's jurisdiction. Part IV
suggests two possible frameworks for determining whether a court
should exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over aliens. The Article
does not call for radical revision of the minimum contacts doctrine;
modest changes would suffice to address the current doctrinal
incoherence existing in the personal jurisdiction jurisprudence of
23. Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal
Jurisdiction:From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAvIs L.

REV. 19, 57 & nn. 226-27 (1990) (noting that "[a] tremendous amount of
scholarship has been devoted to attempting to untangle [personal jurisdiction]
case law, and each new case brings a flood of commentary" and collecting law
review citations).
24. For the little scholarship that exists, see Haugen, supra note 12, at 109;
Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdictionand Forum Non Conveniens
in International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposalfor a Uniform
Standard, 28 TEX. INT'L L.J. 501 (1993); Andrew L. Strauss, Where America
Ends and the International Order Begins: Interpreting the JurisdictionalReach
of the U.S. Constitution in Light of a Proposed Hague Convention on
Jurisdictionand Satisfaction of Judgments, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1237 (1998). Of the

scholarship that does exist, much of it is outdated because it was written before
or shortly after the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Asahi Metal
Industries Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987). See, e.g., Born,
supra note 5, at 1; Degnan & Kane, supra note 15, at 799; Lilly, supra note 5, at
85; Janice Toran, Federalism,Personal Jurisdiction,and Aliens, 58 TUL. L. REV.

758, 758 (1984).
25. Russell J. Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the Pelsonal
Jurisdictionof State Courts: Time for Change, 63 OR. L. REV. 485, 487 (1984).
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international cases and remedy its negative effects. The better and
doctrinally sound approach, however, would be to untether once and
for all the personal jurisdiction analysis from due process when the
defendant is foreign.
II.

A SHORT HISTORY OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

The history of personal jurisdiction has been told often, from
various perspectives.
Common in the history's assessment,
however, is that the Due Process Clause, 21 with its focus on a

defendant's liberty interests, has become the key, if not only,
limitation on a court's exercise of jurisdiction. But it was not always
this way.
A.

The Demise of TerritorialSovereignty

Before the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, jurisdictional
limits were a matter of common law, derived from international
legal principles.
Under international law, territorial jurisdiction
"arose among a band of independent sovereigns, limited
in what
they could do, but more importantly limiting themselves in what
they would do in order to avoid stepping on the others' toes."28 In
the United States, jurisdiction was based on territoriality: a theory
derived from Dutch scholars 29 holding that "each sovereign had
26. Generally, with some limited exceptions, the application of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments has been treated the same in the personal
jurisdiction analysis. Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and "Purposeful
Availment" A Reassessment of Fifth Amendment Limits on Personal
Jurisdiction,98 Nw. U. L. REV. 455, 456, 460-61 (2004) (critically noting that
most commentators and courts assume that the jurisdictional "limits imposed
by the Fifth Amendment are comparable to those imposed on the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment").
27. See, e.g., D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850); Patrick J.
Borchers, Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the United States and the
European Community: Lessons for American Reform, 40 Am.J. COMP. L. 121,
123 (1992) (explaining that "[elarly on, the Supreme Court considered
jurisdictional precepts to be a matter of common law, deduced from
international law"); Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal
Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 871-76 (1989) (discussing how the
original federal common law rules of jurisdiction were based on territorial rules
derived from international law).
28. CLERMONT, supra note 9, at 5; see also id. at 5-7 (arguing that the
original thrust behind jurisdictional rules was grounded not in concepts of
power, but the "desirable allocation of jurisdictional authority among competing
sovereigns").
29. James Weinstein, The Dutch Influence on the Conception of Judicial
Jurisdiction in 19th Century America, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 73, 74-85 (1990)
(discussing how early American jurisdictional theories developed from Dutch
theorists, such as Ulrich Huber).
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jurisdiction, exclusive of all other sovereigns, to bind persons and
things present within its territorial boundaries. '0 Jurisdiction was
not a matter of constitutional law. 31 To the extent the Constitution
was relevant to jurisdictional precepts, only the Full Faith and
Credit Clause 32 was important, and the Supreme Court drew on
international law to interpret it.33 The Full Faith and Credit Clause
required states to recognize, without reexamination, sister-state
judgments so long as the judgment remained faithful to
international jurisdictional rules. 3' These jurisdictional principles of
35
international law were adopted in numerous early cases.
30. CLERMONT, supra note 9, at 6.
31. Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have to Do With Jurisdiction?,46
RUTGERS L. REV. 1071, 1104 (1994) (noting that at the time, since it "seemed
obvious to treat the United States as a collection of interrelated but sovereign
states," courts routinely turned to "the law of nations for appropriate
[jurisdictional] principles and rules"); see also Max Rheinstein, The
Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 796-808 (1955)
(explaining that the American colonies inherited a long-standing tradition from
international law that recognized territorial borders as the key limitation on a
sovereign's authority and jurisdiction).
32.

U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1.

33. Id.; see Borchers, supra note 23, at 29-32 (arguing that in personam
jurisdiction historically was a matter of common law and a concern over
whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause effected that common law); Conison,
supra note 31, at 1104 (arguing that initially "[t]he Full Faith and Credit
Clause and its implementing act, as well as the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, were virtually the only federal constraints on interstate legal relations"
(footnotes omitted)); Halverson, supra note 12, at 146 ("In resolving [the
interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause], the Supreme Court
consistently relied on international law... ."). See generally Ralph U. Whitten,
The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A HistoricalInterpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process
Clauses (Part Two), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 735 (1981) (reviewing historical
materials related to the Full Faith and Credit Clause and questioning whether
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause was originally intended to
limit a court's jurisdictional authority).
34. D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 174 (1850); see also Mills v.
Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 485-86 (1813) (Johnson, J., dissenting)
(explaining that a collateral attack on a sister state judgment for lack of
personal jurisdiction does not offend the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
35. Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350, 367 (1873) (discussing territorial
limits of jurisdiction); D'Arcy, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 174 (finding a New York
judgment invalid because it was rendered against a noncitizen who had not
been served in New York and owned no property there); Ogden v. Saunders, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 255 (1827) (holding that state insolvency proceedings
could not discharge claims of noncitizen creditors). See generally Borchers,
supra note 23, at 25 n.21 (listing the large number of cases on jurisdictional
topics decided prior to Pennoyer); Trangsrud, supra note 27, at 872 & nn.116-20
(listing early cases that approached personal jurisdiction using principles from
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The U.S. Supreme Court continued to embrace sovereigntybased jurisdictional principles after the Fourteenth Amendment's
ratification; yet, the source of those principles changed. In 1877, the
Court handed down the landmark decision Pennoyer v. Neff." That
case asked whether the federal courts should recognize as valid a
default judgment that an Oregon state court had entered against
nonresident defendant Neff in a prior lawsuit. In the original
lawsuit, the Oregon court asserted jurisdiction over Neff "even
though he was neither domiciled nor present in the state."37 The
Court held that the Oregon court lacked the power to assume
jurisdiction, and the judgment was accordingly void.3" A plaintiff,
the Court concluded, must serve an unwilling, nonresident
defendant within the state's boundaries for the state court to have
jurisdiction.
In reaching this conclusion, the Pennoyer Court relied on the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause; by doing so it exalted
the "theory of territorial sovereignty" to the status of constitutional
doctrine. 40 The case succinctly stated its jurisdictional principles in
terms of territorial integrity: "every State possesses exclusive
jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within [a
state's] territory . . . [and] no State can exercise direct jurisdiction41

and authority over persons or property without its territory."
Sovereignty thus necessarily restricted a state court's authority;
"[a]ny attempt to exercise authority beyond [its territorial] limits
the Law of Nations).

36. 95 U.S. 714 (1877), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977). Although Pennoyer is "widely read and cited as the source of the Court's
theories of territorial jurisdiction," the "Court had articulated these rules many
times prior to 1877 and continued to do so afterwards." Trangsrud, supra note
27, at 874 (footnotes omitted). For a general discussion of the early cases
leading to Pennoyer, see Borchers, supra note 23, at 25-32; Terry S. Kogan, A
Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257, 277-98
(1990).
37. Greenstein, supra note 3, at 862.
38. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734.
39. Id.; see also Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of Personal
Jurisdiction,68 Mo. L. REV. 753, 753 (2003).
40. George Rutherglen, International Shoe and the Legacy of Legal
Realism, 2001 SuP. CT. REV. 347, 348; see also Kogan, supra note 36, at 298
(noting that a "common theme unites much of modem thinking in personal
jurisdiction"-that Pennoyer caused doctrinal confusion by "engrafting, without
justification, the sovereignty-based international law approach to territorial
jurisdiction into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment"). The
seminal article criticizing Justice Story's territorial theory of jurisdiction and
Justice Field's adoption of that approach in Pennoyer is Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction,1965 SuP. CT. REV. 241, 252-62.
41. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
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an illegitimate
would be deemed in every other forum .
assumption of power."" As a result, presence within a forum state's
territorial borders became the "sine qua non standard for personal
jurisdiction."45
The Pennoyer holding-and its reliance on territorial
sovereignty and physical presence-was still faithful to the then
existing international law." Pennoyer's analysis relied on both
Story's treatise on conflict of laws and Wheaton's treatise on
international law.4 5 Even though due process was referenced in
dicta, 4 the Pennoyer decision embraced the established sovereignty42. Id. at 720; cf Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 486 (1813)
(Johnson, J., dissenting) ("[Jlurisdiction cannot be justly exercised by a state
over property not within the reach of its process, or over persons not owing
them allegiance or not subjected to their jurisdiction.");
The courts of a state, however general may be their jurisdiction, are
necessarily confided to the territorial limits of the state. Their process
cannot be executed beyond those limits; and any attempt to act upon
persons or things beyond them, would be deemed an usurpation of
foreign sovereignty, not justified or acknowledged by the law of
nations.
Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 611 (D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134).; see also
Dearing v. Bank of Charleston, 5 Ga. 497, 515 (1848) (explaining that "no
sovereign can extend its process beyond its territorial limits, to subject either
persons or property to its judicial decisions"). See generally Strauss, supra note
24, at 1250-54 (describing early cases and the "era of territorial jurisdiction").
43. Yokoyama, supra note 16, at 1151 (citing Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722).
44. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. Commentators on Pennoyer have often made
this observation. Degnan & Kane, supra note 15, at 814-15; Halverson, supra
note 12, at 144; Hazard, supra note 40, at 262-65. But cf Weinstein, supra note
3, at 173-74 (arguing that "home grown common law rule[s]" rather than
international law was the source of the jurisdictional rules found in D'Arcy v.
Ketchum, a key case proceeding Pennoyer). This territorial or sovereignty-based
approach was followed in other areas of the law, such as the presumption
against extraterritorial application of law and in the enforcement of judgments
T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE
law.
CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 12-18 (2002).
45. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
46. Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the
In Personam Jurisdictionof State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 572 (1958)
(describing how Pennoyer's discussion of due process was dictum); Trangsrud,
supra note 27, at 876-80 (arguing that Justice Field's reliance on the Due
Process Clause as the basis for federal rules limiting State judicial power was
unprecedented, unexplained, and unnecessary); James Weinstein, The Federal
Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern
Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 174 (2004) (describing how Pennoyer interpreted
the newly adopted Fourteenth Amendment in dictum). For a discussion of
Pennoyer's questionable reliance on the Due Process Clause given the timing of
the case in relation to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Wendy
Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal
Jurisdictionand Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479, 502-03 (1987)
(noting that Justice Field's discussion of Due Process was largely dictum) and
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based international law approach to international jurisdiction.47
This was nothing new: at the time when the Constitution was under
debate 8 and for a hundred years thereafter, "[t]he restriction on
jurisdiction over persons beyond the territorial power continued as a
feature of the state court system and the states continued to
operate, with respect to each other, as states of the world rather
than as states linked together in a union." 9
In 1945, however, the Supreme Court abandoned the strict
territoriality-based approach to jurisdiction Pennoyer embraced. 50
Regarded as the fountainhead of modern personal jurisdiction
doctrine, InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington51 suggested that the
"Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution is the sole limitation on a state's power to subject an
out-of-state defendant to the personal jurisdiction of its courts."52 In
its now famous articulation of the "minimum contacts" test, the
Court explained that due process requires that a defendant "not
present within the territory of the forum ...

have certain minimum

contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does53
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'
The Court further indicated that "[a]n 'estimate of the
inconveniences"' to the defendant was relevant to the analysis.' In

Whitten, supra note 33, at 821 (explaining how Pennoyer's discussion of Due
Process is dictum because of the timing of the case and the Fourteenth
Amendment).
47. Redish, supra note 20, at 1116; see also Kogan, supra note 36, at 270
(noting that the personal jurisdiction doctrine in the United States was "clearly
an outgrowth of common law principles of international sovereignty").
48. Personal jurisdiction at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's
ratification and Pennoyer was a compromise between two constitutional views,
rooted in how nation-states interact with one another: "[olne vision viewed the
states as cooperative units in a national sovereign union; the other viewed the
states as competing sovereigns loosely knit together." Kogan, supra note 36, at
270-71.
49. Simon E. Sobeloff, Jurisdictionof State Courts Over Non-Residents in
our Federal System, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 196, 199 (1957-1958) (relying on and
citing to Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839)).
50. For discussions of how InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945), dramatically broke from the jurisdictional theories established in
Pennoyer, see Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in
the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 692 & n.17 (1987)
(describing International Shoe as a break with, not a refinement of, Pennoyer
and listing commentators discussing the history of personal jurisdiction).
51. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
52. Condlin, supra note 3, at 57.
53. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,
463 (1940)).
54. Id. at 317 (citing Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141
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so ruling, the Court found jurisdiction may be appropriately
exercised regardless of a defendant's physical presence within the
forum state's territorial boundaries." The strict territorial model of
jurisdiction-and
its reliance on international
sovereignty
principles-had been replaced.
B.

The Rise of Due Process

If territorial sovereignty was the governing paradigm for cases
before International Shoe, due process and its focus on the
individual litigant was the one for the cases that followed. After
International Shoe, "the relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive
sovereignty of the States on which the rules of Pennoyer rest[ed],
became the central concern of the inquiry into personal
jurisdiction." 56 This is not to say that territoriality and allocation of
sovereign authority were no longer part of the equation, but they
were relegated to a secondary role.
International Shoe signaled a radical change and a new theory
of jurisdiction; nevertheless, the full impact of that change was not
felt for several decades.57 In 1977, the Court purported to overturn
Pennoyer's reliance on territoriality once and for all by holding that
the presence of property within jurisdictional boundaries did not
guarantee a court the power to exercise jurisdiction.5 8 In Shaffer v.
Heitner,59 the Court disclaimed the Pennoyer notion that "territorial
power is both essential to and sufficient for jurisdiction." ° "[Aill
assertions of state-court jurisdiction," the Court explained, "must be
evaluated according to the standards [of fair play and substantial
justice] set forth in InternationalShoe and its progeny." 61 The case
(2d Cir. 1930); see also Redish, supra note 20, at 1117.
55. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17.
56. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
57. Rutherglen, supra note 40, at 358-59 ("[The] immediate reaction to
InternationalShoe was surprisingly subdued.").
58. Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction:General Theories
Compared and Evaluated, 63 B.U. L. REV. 279, 305 (1983) (explaining how any

"theoretical ambivalence" that remained after International Shoe "came to an
end" with Shaffer).
59. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
60. Id. at 211.
61. Id. at 212. With Shaffer, the Court shifted the focus onto the
"individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the illegitimate power of a
foreign sovereign." Kevin M. Clermont, JurisdictionalSalvation and the Hague
Treaty, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 89, 100 (1999).
Before International Shoe,
jurisdictional limits advanced the idea of "reciprocal sovereignty"; that is, "State
1 would not reach far into State 2's domain in exchange for State 2's restraint in
analogous cases." Id. When property was present in a jurisdiction, this concern
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found the practice of attaching property as a means of securing
jurisdiction did not comport with modern fair play standards.62
Any doubt that the limits of personal jurisdiction reflect an
understanding of an individual's due process liberty interest rather
than the limits of sovereign authority was eradicated in 1982. In
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 3
the Supreme Court clarified that "[tihe personal jurisdiction
requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest.
It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of
sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.'4
The Due
Process Clause, the Court explained, is "the only source of the
personal jurisdiction requirement. 6, 5 Any restrictions imposed by
individual state sovereignty, the Court went on to explain, "must be
seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest
preserved by the Due Process Clause," because "the Clause itself
makes no mention of federalism concerns.""6 Lower courts naturally
paralleled the rejection of sovereignty concerns as part of the
jurisdictional analysis."
of reciprocal sovereignty was nonexistent, and, therefore, jurisdiction would be
proper.
62. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212.
63. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
64. Id. at 702; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472
n.13 (1985) (citing to Insurance Corp. of Ireland and reaffirming that liberty
interests constrain a court's exercise of jurisdiction).
65. Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 703 n.10.
66. Id.; see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471-72 & n.13 (noting that

jurisdictional due process protections serve to safeguard the liberty interests of
the individual, rather than those of federalism). See generally Harold S. Lewis,
Jr., The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the
Jurisprudenceof Personal Jurisdiction,58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 699 (1983)

(arguing that "the resilience of state sovereignty in the personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence" died after the Insurance Corp. of Ireland case).
67. See, e.g., Peay v. BellSouth Med. Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1210
(10th Cir. 2000) (noting that the limits of personal jurisdiction flow from
individual liberty interests and not sovereignty); Busch v. Buchman, Buchman
& O'Brien, Law Firm, 11 F.3d 1255, 1257 (5th Cir. 1994) (observing that
personal jurisdiction limitations do not arise from the limitations inherent in
sovereignty); Pardazi v. Cullman Med. Ctr., 896 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir.
1990) ("Unlike the rules of subject matter jurisdiction, the rules of personal
jurisdiction protect an individual's rights, not a sovereign's rights."); Simon v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 95, 130 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ("More recent
Supreme Court cases appear to reject sovereignty concerns as a justification for
due process limits on personal jurisdiction, positing the protection of individual
liberty interests as their primary rationale."); Cannon v. Gardner-Martin
Asphalt Corp. Ret. Trust Profit Sharing Plan, 699 F. Supp. 265, 267-68 (M.D.
Fla. 1988) (employing nonsovereignty factors in deciding personal jurisdiction
based on InsuranceCorp. of Ireland).
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This evolution toward a due process focus is also evident in the
development and creation of "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice" as an independent prong of the jurisdiction test.
Generally, the judicial approach to personal jurisdiction analysis
has been to determine first whether a defendant has the necessary
minimum contacts with the forum state to satisfy due process.68 If
the defendant has minimum contacts, the defendant must present a
compelling case that the presence of some of the fair play and
substantial justice factors would render jurisdiction unreasonable to
defeat jurisdiction. 69 The determination of reasonableness involves a
balancing of interests.0 Among the factors considered, the "burden
on the defendant" is seen as a "primary concern" in assessing the
reasonableness of asserting personal jurisdiction. 7' This inquiry
68. Linda J. Silberman, "Two Cheers" for International Shoe (and None for
Asahi): An Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary of International Shoe, 28 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 755, 760 (1995).
69. Leslie W. Abramson, Clarifying "FairPlay and Substantial Justice":
How the Courts Apply the Supreme Court Standard for Personal Jurisdiction,
18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441, 446 (1991); see also Silberman, supra note 68, at
760-61 (describing the two-step level of analysis in the personal jurisdiction
inquiry and the relatively new focus on fairness).
70. In its most recent cases, the Supreme Court has referred to five factors
that must be weighed and balanced:
A court must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of
the forum State, and the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief. It
must also weigh in its determination "the interstate judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and
the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies."
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (quoting
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
71. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; see also Caruth v. Int'l
Psychoanalytical Ass'n, 59 F.3d 126, 128 (9th Cir. 1995) (analyzing seven
factors but finding that the defendant's burden is the most important in the
reasonableness assessment); Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 212
(1st Cir. 1994) (explaining that determining the defendant's burden and
inconvenience is the most important inquiry); Ins. Co. of. North America v.
Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1272 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The law of personal
jurisdiction,. .. is asymmetrical. The primary concern is for the burden on a
defendant."); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 94 (3d ed. 1996) (recognizing the
"[pirimary importance of defendant's contacts and inconvenience"); Abramson,
supra note 69, at 447 ("The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the
burden on the defendant is always a primary concern in assessing the
reasonableness of jurisdiction."); Peter Hay, Judicial JurisdictionOver ForeignCountry CorporateDefendants-Comments on Recent Case Law, 63 OR. L. REV.
431, 431-33, 451 (1984) (suggesting that the Supreme Court has become more
defendant-orientated, with personal jurisdiction focusing on the inconvenience
to the foreign defendant); von Mehren, supra note 58, at 321-22 (explaining the
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assesses the inconvenience and expense to the defendant of
appearing in the forum including: "the location of potential
witnesses, documents and records; whether the defendant has a
subsidiary or agent [that] maintains an office or other physical
presence in the forum; [and]
the distance between the defendant's
72
residence and the forum."

Despite the due process focus, the U.S. Supreme Court has
never wholly discarded taking sovereignty concerns into account in
its personal jurisdiction analysis.

73

The Court has often referred

4

back to sovereignty principles.
In Hanson v. Denckla,5 the Court
noted that the restrictions on personal jurisdiction are "more than a
guaranty of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They
are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the
respective

States." 71

Two

decades

later,

in

World-Wide

7

Volkswagen, the Court again emphasized that it has "never
accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for
jurisdictional purposes, nor could [the Court], and remain faithful to
the principles of interstate federalism embodied in the
Constitution."7 8 And, of course, the "minimum contacts" standard at
reasons behind the focus on the defendant and not the plaintiff in the
jurisdictional analysis).
72. Walter W. Heiser, Toward Reasonable Limitations on the Exercise of
General Jurisdiction,41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1035, 1043 (2004).

73. Many academics have indicated that the constitutional limitation on
state court jurisdiction can not just be the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Robert
C. Casad, Personal Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1589, 1591 & n.8 (1992) (listing scholars supporting the argument that "[iut is
now reasonably clear that the source [of constitutional limitations on state court
jurisdiction] is not just the Due Process Clause... [and that] [o]ther
constitutional provisions may be more important"); Margaret G. Stewart, A New
Litany of Personal Jurisdiction, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 5, 18-19 (1989) (arguing
that state sovereignty considerations as part of the personal jurisdiction

calculus is "mandated by history"); James Weinstein, The Early American
Origins of Territoriality in Judicial Jurisdiction, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1, 60
(1992) ("[T]he measure of the legitimacy of a state's assertion of authority over
an individual should reflect [a state's] territoriality.").
74.

Borchers, supra note 27, at 126 (describing how after International

Shoe and "[o]ver the course of the next forty-six years ... the Court revived,
then dismissed, then revived, then dismissed, then revived, a 'sovereignty'
factor in the jurisdictional calculus" (footnotes omitted)).
75. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
76. Id. at 251.
77. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
78. Id. at 293. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court explained that "the

reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over the defendant must be assessed 'in
the context of our federal system of government.'" Id. at 293-94 (quoting Int'l
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317). The Court went on to note that "the Framers...
intended that the States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty...
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face value implies some sort of territorial limitation on state power.

79

But even cases that paid lip-service to sovereignty conceptssuch as Hanson or World-Wide Volkswagen-couched them in terms
of due process.8 0 And soon after making statements that appeared to
endorse sovereignty considerations in the personal jurisdiction
analysis, the Court was quick to denigrate them and limit their
effect.81 Scholarly conclusions were even less generous:
Put bluntly, the neo-sovereign utterances of the Court since
InternationalShoe enjoy scant standing in precedent, amount
to little more than fanciful obiter dicta on facts that fell short
of satisfying party-fairness standards, and make no discernible
decisional difference....

By resisting the temptation to succumb to sovereignty, the
Court has freed itself from a formalistic ghost of Pennoyer.
Unencumbered by governmental interest baggage, it may
continue to chart a course consistent with the individual rights
focus of InternationalShoe.s2

[and] [t]he sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the
sovereignty of all of its sister States-a limitation express or implicit in both the
original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at
293.
79. Id. at 291-92; see also Stein, supra note 50, at 689 (arguing that
"assertions of jurisdiction, as exercises of power, ought to reflect the general
limits on state sovereignty inherent in a federal system").
80. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293-94.
81. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 & n.20 (1977) (explaining
that Hanson simply "makes the point that the States are defined by their
geographical territory" and Hanson's invocation of sovereignty was not to
suggest sovereignty is of central concern to the personal jurisdiction analysis);
Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 &
n.10 (1982) (noting that nothing in World-Wide Volkswagen should be
interpreted to change the focus of analysis away from a defendant's liberty
interests); cf. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) ("While the
interests of the forum State . . .are, of course, to be considered, an essential
criterion in all cases is whether the 'quality and nature' of the defendant's
activity is such that it is 'reasonable' and 'fair' to require him to conduct his
defense in that State." (citations omitted)).
82. Lewis, supra, note 66, at 716, 724, 742 (arguing that in Insurance Corp.
of Ireland. the court "scotched sovereignty altogether"); Louise Weinberg, The
Helicopter Case and the Jurisprudenceof Jurisdiction, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 913,
923 (1985) (explaining that the Supreme Court has "quietly but summarily
banished concerns of federalism or comity from the due process inquiry" and
"disembarrassed itself' of its "brief flirtation" with sovereignty concerns in the
Ins. Corp. of Ir. case); cf Rutherglen, supra note 40, at 348-49 ("The only
dispute, as a descriptive matter, is over how many remnants are left of the old
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In any case, sovereignty remains (at most) a secondary
consideration of the personal jurisdiction analysis. The Court has
plainly said that even strong state interests cannot justify
jurisdiction unless the forum would be "fair" to the defendant.83
C.

Modern Law and NonresidentAliens

Although significant debate in the scholarly literature has raged
over the proper role of individual liberty interests and sovereignty
concerns, no similar debate exists when the defendant is foreign.
The Supreme Court cases involving nonresident alien defendants
are built on two commonalities. First, "the Court has approached
international jurisdiction as an ad hoc appendage" to its domestic
jurisdiction cases.84 Second, as discussed below, the Court has

formal territorial theory ...[the] exceptions stand like isolated ruins, revealing

how completely the old rules have been devastated and how little reconstruction
has occurred.").
83. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 215; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985) (explaining that courts must decline to exercise
jurisdiction if prosecution of the action in the forum state would be
unreasonable and unfair); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980) (noting
that shifting the focus from the defendant's due process rights to the plaintiffs
interests in a convenient forum is "forbidden by International Shoe and its
progeny"); Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92, 98 (characterizing the interests of the forum
as "important," yet considering fairness to the defendant the "essential criterion
in all cases").
84. Strauss, supra note 24, at 1237; see also 1 VED P. NANDA & DAVID K.
PANsIUs,

LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DIsPuTEs IN U.S. COURTS

3-52 (2003)

(describing domestic jurisdictional principles as applicable to foreign
defendants); Adams, supra note 11, at 113-31 (describing domestic
jurisdictional principles as applicable to foreign defendants); Degnan & Kane,
supra note 15, at 804 (noting that in international cases, "the courts and the
parties seem not even to have recognized that the nonresident defendant's
status as an alien might suggest that a different [personal jurisdiction] inquiry
would be appropriate"); Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for Globetrotting, 28
U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 1027, 1037-38 (1995) (noting that the Court now "tends to
treat transnational cases as if they were interstate in nature"); Andrew L.
Strauss, Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the International Law of
Personal Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, 36 HARv. INT'L L.J. 373, 387 & n.51

(1995) [hereinafter Strauss, Beyond National Law] (explaining that "courts
assume that the domestic doctrines related to jurisdiction that allow forums to
decline to exercise their constitutional grant of jurisdiction are applicable to all
cases regardless of the nationality of the litigants" and citing cases in support of
this assessment); Toran, supra note 24, at 770-71 ("[C]ourts have assumed that
identical due process concerns exist in cases involving domestic and alien
defendants."). Every Supreme Court decision involving challenges to a state
court's jurisdiction over a foreigner have assumed the minimum contacts test as
developed in domestic cases applies equally to foreigners. See, e.g., Helicopteros
Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984); Ins. Corp. of Ir.
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embraced the notion that due process and individual liberty is the
key constraint on a court's jurisdiction.
Both commonalities,
however, appear to have been the result of happenstance, not
deliberate choice.
1.

The Due Process Assumption

Current law involving alien defendants, like with domestic
defendants, is primarily focused on individual due process rights.
The Supreme Court's declaration that the limits of personal
jurisdiction are only a function of a defendant's individual liberty
interests was made in Insurance Corp. of Ireland-a transnational
litigation.6 Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior Court,7 the
Court's most recent case involving foreign defendants, also embodied
an individual liberty approach to personal jurisdiction. 8 That case
arose in California when a motorcycle's rear tire exploded, causing
the motorcycle to collide with a tractor. 9
The California
motorcyclist sued several defendants, including Cheng Shin, the
Taiwanese manufacturer of the tire tube.90 The plaintiff alleged that
the motorcycle's tire and parts were defective. Cheng Shin, in turn,
filed an indemnity cross-claim against several defendants and joined
Asahi, the Japanese manufacturer of the tire's stem valve assembly.
The plaintiff then settled with the defendants, leaving unresolved
only Cheng Shin's indemnity claim against Asahi. 9' The issue before
the Court was whether Asahi, a foreign corporation that had
"place[d] goods into interstate or international commerce ultimately
92
causing injury in the forum state[, was] amenable to jurisdiction."
The only portion of the opinion that commanded a majority was
on the fairness issue; eight of the nine Justices found it
unreasonable for a Japanese corporation to be required to defend an
indemnity claim brought by a Taiwanese corporation in a California
court. 93

In reaching this conclusion, the Court largely "focused on

the distance that the [foreign] defendant would be forced to travel to

v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10 (1982); Perkins v.
Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 444 (1952). Only Asahi, while
applying the same standard, noted that foreign cases raise unique concerns.
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987).
85. See infra notes 86-130 and accompanying text.
86. Ins. Co. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 703 n.10.
87. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
88. Rutherglen, supra note 40, at 361.
89. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105-06.
90. Id. at 106.
91. Id.
92. Silberman, supra note 24, at 508.
93. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116.
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defend itself," and the other burdens the defendant would face. 4
Although a majority agreed that the assertion of jurisdiction would
be unfair, the Court could not agree as to what degree of contact
with a forum state was sufficient to establish jurisdiction.
On the
minimum contacts question-whether Asahi had contacts with
California sufficient to justify jurisdiction-the Court split fourfour.96 Because of cases like Asahi and Insurance Corp. of Ireland,
many believe that "[t]he 'burden on the defendant' may be the most
influential of the reasonableness factors in international
litigation.
Courts, of course, recognize that international cases raise
special considerations. The Supreme Court has warned that the
burden of mounting a defense in a foreign legal system is "unique"
and should be afforded "significant weight in assessing the
reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction
over national borders."8 As the Court cautioned in Asahi: "[g]reat
care and reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of
personal jurisdiction into the international field." 99 But despite the
recognition that alien defendants may have special burdens, the
Court has failed to articulate what specific concerns are involved or
what weight to accord foreign interests."0
94. Maltz, supra note 3, at 679. In Asahi, the Court ruled that due to the
international context: 1) the forum state, California, had a "small interest in
deciding a dispute between two foreign firms" disputing contribution rights; 2)
the defendant's burden in litigating was unacceptably high; and 3) "the
plaintiffs interest in litigating in California was slight." Abramson, supra note
69, at 444 (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112-16).
95. The case introduced a two-tiered analysis: "The test required
determining, first, whether contacts sufficient for an exercise of jurisdiction
exist, and second, whether exercise of that jurisdiction under all of the
circumstances [was] reasonable." Silberman, supra note 24, at 509. The Asahi
decision and its two-tiered approach have been widely criticized. See, e.g.,
Silberman, supra note 68, at 760; Russell J. Weintraub, Asahi Sends Personal
JurisdictionDown the Tubes, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 55, 62-63 (1988).
96. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 103-04, 112; Silberman, supra note 24, at 508 &
n.27.
97. Heiser, supra note 72, at 1043.
98. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114; accord Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. John Holland
Party Ltd., 995 F.2d 474, 478-79 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming dismissal because
litigating in a Maryland court would "unquestionably impose a heavy burden"
on an Australian defendant); Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd.,
906 F.2d 369, 376 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that Asahi "counsel[s] caution in the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over alien defendants").
99. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115 (quoting United States v. First Nat'l City Bank,
379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
100. Degnan & Kane, supra note 15, at 800 ("Unfortunately, the [Asahi]
Court failed adequately to come to grips with what special consideration ought
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Without any guidance, lower courts have been ill-equipped to
decide whether jurisdiction exists over foreigners; lower courts
reveal deep confusion over what exact standard to apply. On the
first inquiry, whether the defendant has minimum contacts,
obtaining jurisdiction over an alien abroad-despite Asahi's
warnings-is often easier than obtaining jurisdiction over a
domestic defendant.'0 ' Unlike with domestic defendants, a federal
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant
based on an aggregation of contacts with the United States as a
whole, rather than based on the defendant's contacts with the state
in which the court sits.' 2 Although the Supreme Court has never
directly addressed its constitutionality, 0 3 courts will often permit a
"national contacts" approach when dealing with foreign
Commentators have noted other differences that
defendants.'
relax the standard for asserting jurisdiction over foreigners.' 0 '

to be given, and instead limited itself to the mere recognition that courts should
be aware of the special burdens imposed on aliens defending here when
assessing the fairness of asserting jurisdiction over them.").
101. Born, supra note 5, at 6-10 (listing cases and demonstrating a threeway split pre-Asahi as to what jurisdictional standard to apply).
102. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) (authorizing national contacts approach when
no State exists with jurisdiction over defendant). See generally Degnan & Kane,
supra note 15, at 813-24 (explaining why the national contacts approach should
determine personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants); Lilly, supra note 5, at
127-45 (discussing "aggregation of contacts" by federal courts); Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Nationalizing InternationalLaw: Essay in Honor of Louis Henkin,
36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 121, 139-40 (1997) (arguing for the national contact
approach).
103. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 n.* (expressly declining to consider "whether
Congress could, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, authorize federal court personal jurisdiction over alien defendants
based on the aggregate of national contacts").
104. See, e.g., Warfield v. KR Entm't, Inc. (In re Fed. Fountain, Inc.), 165
F.3d 600, 601 (8th Cir. 1999) (adopting the national contacts approach and
"align[ing] [itself] with virtually every other court that has ruled on the issue");
SEC v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1543-44 (11th Cir. 1997) (adopting the national
contacts approach); Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai-Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1415-17
(9th Cir. 1989) (applying the national contacts approach).
105. As one commentator noted:
Contrary perhaps to the teaching in Asahi ... lower courts have held
that the standards for piercing the corporate veil under U.S. law,
already low by international standards, should be relaxed further in
the international context to permit the exercise of judicial jurisdiction
Running afoul of
over foreign parents of U.S. subsidiaries.
international and national legal standards which traditionally
required some indicia of abuse of the corporate form, these courts have
disregarded, if not inverted, comity by requiring a showing of little
more than joint ownership and some degree of day-to-day control by
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Under general jurisdiction principles, for instance, foreign
companies that conduct business in many parts of the world can be
sued in the United States over wrongful acts and injuries occurring
solely abroad. °6
As to whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable, the
analysis is considerably more muddled. The factors to consider "are
amorphous and courts seem to use them to rationalize whatever
decision they have already made." 107 Cases reach contrary results on
nearly identical facts.' 8 Predicting how a court will apply the
fairness factors, therefore, is difficult.'0 9
the parent in order to spare U.S. plaintiffs the inconvenience of
litigating their claims abroad.
Brian Pearce, Note, The Comity Doctrine as a Barrierto JudicialJurisdiction:A

U.S.-E. U. Comparison, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 525, 532 (1994).
106. Heiser, supra note 72, at 1039.
107. Adams, supra note 11, at 123; see also Condlin, supra note 3, at 121
(explaining that confusion in the minimum contacts standard has licensed
"result-oriented lower court judges to take a Robin-Hood perspective on
jurisdictional questions and to 'do the right thing' no matter the cost in
doctrinal clarity or predictability, though so far, few lower courts seem to have
exercised this option"); Conison, supra note 31, at 1201 (arguing that the
reasonableness inquiry permits a court to "rationalize a decision based on
instinct"); Walter W. Heiser, A "Minimum Interest" Approach to Personal
Jurisdiction,35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915, 925-27 (2000) (concluding that an

absence of meaningful standards permit a court to justify any "reasonableness"
conclusion it desires); McFarland, supra note 39, at 777-78 (noting that
decisions have little precedential value and that courts are required to "engage
in a pointillist process with little guidance," which renders the minimum
contacts test a "conclusion rather than a reason"); Howard B. Stravitz,
Sayonara to Minimum Contacts: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 39
S.C. L. REV. 729, 805 (1988) ("[T]he current test is difficult to apply, and it is
unlikely to promote consistent and predictable results.").
108. Compare Deprenyl Animal Health Inc. v. Univ. of Toronto Innovations
Found., 297 F.3d 1343, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding minimal burden on
Canadian corporation to defend in Kansas) and Aristech Chem. Int'l Ltd. v.
Acrylic Fabricators Ltd., 138 F.3d 624, 629 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding minimal
burden on Canadian defendant to defend in Kentucky) with OMI Holdings, Inc.
v. Royal Ins. Co. of Can., 149 F.3d 1086, 1096 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding it
unreasonable to exercise personal jurisdiction over a Canadian company in
Kansas because "[diefendants will not only have to travel outside their home
country, they will also be forced to litigate the dispute in a foreign forum").
109. Adams, supra note 11, at 123; see, e.g., Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942
F.2d 617, 625 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding jurisdiction in California over two foreign
defendants from Mexico and Spain, even though only two of the reasonableness
factors favored plaintiff while three factors favored defendants, and defendants
had "ma[d]e a strong argument ... that the exercise of jurisdiction may be
unreasonable"); see also Bruce Posnak, The Court Doesn't Know Its Asahi From
Its Wortman: A Critical View of the ConstitutionalConstraints on Jurisdiction
and Choice of Law, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 875, 887-96 (1990) (criticizing the
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For foreign defendants who have some contact to the United
States, jurisdiction is almost never denied on fairness grounds."
Although cases will purport to consider all the fairness factors, the
lower court decisions often turn on the defendant's burden of
litigating in the United States."' Courts are likely to find the
exercise of jurisdiction reasonable, unless the defendant and its
witnesses have to travel extremely long distances." 2 This has
provided increasingly less protection from jurisdictional assertions,
as courts believe that "modern advances in communications and
transportation have significantly reduced the burden of litigating in

uncertainty and ad hoc balancing the reasonableness test requires); Rutherglen,
supra note 40, at 368 (describing limitations of the "rule skepticism" that legal
realists cultivated in the fairness inquiry).
110. BORN, supra note 71, at 142 ("In general, lower courts have been
reluctant to decline jurisdiction over foreign defendants that have minimum
contacts with the forum because of reasonableness concerns.").
111. Abramson, supra note 69, at 449-50 (citing cases); see also
Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 210 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing cases
and explaining that "most of the cases that have been dismissed on grounds of
unreasonableness are cases in which the defendant's center of gravity, be it
place of residence or place of business, was located at an appreciable distance
from the forum").
112. See, e.g., Deprenyl, 297 F.3d at 1356 (finding the burden on Canadian
corporation to defend in Kansas court minimal "in light of modern
transportation and communication methods," and the similarity between the
U.S. and Canadian legal systems); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226
F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding that the burden imposed on European
parent companies to litigate in New York not sufficient to preclude jurisdiction);
Aristech Chem., 138 F.3d at 628 (finding that jurisdiction over a Canadian
corporation was reasonable when distance between Ontario, Canada and
Kentucky was not overly burdensome when a "short plane flight separates
Ontario from Kentucky"); Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts Ltd., 94 F.3d 623,
631-32 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the burden of forcing a Canadian
defendant to litigate in Florida was "uncompelling"); Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d
53, 64 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that the burden on a New York defendant to
defend in Puerto Rico was not unacceptable or unreasonable); Theunissen v.
Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1462 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding only a slight burden on
the defendant when Detroit was only approximately ten miles from Windsor,
Ontario, Canada, the defendant's residence); S. Sys., Inc. v. Torrid Oven Ltd.,
58 F. Supp. 2d 843, 852 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (finding a minimal burden on a
Canadian defendant given the similarities in legal systems and the short flight
from Canada to Tennessee); Ensign-Bickford Co. v. ICI Explosives USA Inc.,
817 F. Supp. 1018, 1031 (D. Conn. 1993) (emphasizing the "relatively short
distance from defendant's principal place of business in Ontario, Canada[,] to
the site of this litigation in Connecticut"); Glinka v. Abraham & Rose Co., 199
B.R. 484, 497 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1996) (observing that the "slight" burden of
traveling from Montreal, Canada to Vermont justified the exercise of
jurisdiction).

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

another country."1 1 3 Rare are the cases that find the exercise of
jurisdiction over foreign companies unreasonable, 1 4 and this
normally occurs only when both the plaintiff and the defendant are
foreign."' Accordingly, although the Supreme Court was adamant
113. Heiser, supra note 72, at 1043 n.32; see, e.g., Anderson v. Dassault
Aviation, 361 F.3d 449, 455 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding the exercise of jurisdiction
over a French jet manufacturer reasonable when an Arkansas forum would not
be especially inconvenient and the French company had "ready access to air
transportation for conveniently making the trip"); Mutual Serv. Ins. Co. v. Frit
Indus., Inc., 358 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding the exercise of
jurisdiction over a foreign insurer reasonable because, among other things,
"modern methods of transportation and communication' have lessened the
burden of defending a suit in a foreign jurisdiction" (internal citation omitted));
Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Serv. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1132-33
(9th Cir. 2003) (finding personal jurisdiction over an U.K. insurance broker,
noting that modem advances in transportation and communication have
reduced the burden of foreign litigation, and observing that the defendant did
not face the burden of a language barrier); Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d
1316, 1323 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the location of witnesses and documents
is "no longer weighed heavily given the modem advances in communication and
transportation"); Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1365 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting
that as a rule, requiring a nonresident to defend locally is not constitutionally
unreasonable "[iln this era of fax machines and discount air travel"); see also
Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 575 (2d Cir. 1996);
Sinatra v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 1988) (observing
that "modern advances in communications and transportation have
significantly reduced the burden of litigating in another country").
See
generally CLERMONT, supra note 9, at 12 ("Of course, the revolution in
transportation and communication has increased the occurrence of longdistance disputes, but it has also decreased the burden of long-distance
litigating.").
114. Only if the perceived burden is great do courts reject the exercise of
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Benton v. Cameco Corp., 375 F.3d 1070, 1079-80 (10th
Cir. 2004) (rejecting the exercise of jurisdiction as unreasonable, despite a
Canadian defendant's minimum contacts with the forum, because of the burden
of litigating far from home and in a foreign system); Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel
Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1488-90 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that jurisdiction over
a Swedish defendant sued in California was unreasonable); Amoco Egypt Oil
Co. v. Leonis Navigation Co., 1 F.3d 848, 852 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
jurisdiction was unreasonable over a Filipino defendant sued in Washington);
Cas. Assurance Risk Ins. Brokerage Co. v. Dillon, 976 F.2d 596, 600 (9th Cir.
1992) (finding no personal jurisdiction over a District of Columbia defendant
sued in Guam); Fields v. Sedgwick Associated Risks, Ltd., 796 F.2d 299, 302-03
(9th Cir. 1986) (ruling that specific jurisdiction was unreasonable for a British
defendant sued in California); Pac. Atl. Trading Co. v. M/V Main Express, 758
F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that jurisdiction was unreasonable in
light of the heavy burden on a Malaysian defendant to procure Malaysian
witnesses in the California forum).
115. See, e.g., Glencore Grain Rotterdam v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284
F.3d 1114, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the exercise of general
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in Asahi that international cases raise unique considerations, those
considerations almost never change the outcome.
Peculiarly absent from serious consideration in international
cases are comity concerns, or whether the exercise of jurisdiction
would offend another nation's sovereignty. The cases do not reveal
"what respect for another nation's sovereignty entails."" 6 To the
extent that a court recognizes that a foreign state's sovereignty is
relevant at all, sovereignty concerns usually receive only a passing
mention without analysis. 1 And by default, many courts will find
the exercise of jurisdiction proper simply "when the foreign nation
expresses no sovereign interest in the case and the defendant cites
no foreign policy or political consideration to prevent the United
States court from exercising jurisdiction." 118 Even if the parties
identify a foreign sovereignty interest, courts will commonly find
that U.S. interests override the foreign interests when the "claim is
based on questions of American federal law."" 9 Paradoxically, some
academics believe that considerations of foreign interests-in the
guise of considering the "shared interest" of the several states in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies-will often
"support rather than undermine the reasonableness
of
2
jurisdiction."'

0

jurisdiction was unreasonable in a California action brought by a Dutch
plaintiff against an Indian defendant); Amoco, 1 F.3d at 851-53 (finding a
Washington federal district court's exercise of general jurisdiction to be
unreasonable in a lawsuit that an Egyptian plaintiffs brought against a
Philippine defendant arising out of an accident in Egyptian waters).
116. Bradley W. Paulson, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction Over Aliens:
Unraveling [sic] Entangled Case Law, 13 Hous. J. INT'L L. 117, 123-24 (1990)
(listing cases and noting that the cases are "not helpful in eliciting a clear
understanding of what respect for another nation's sovereignty entails--other
than simply the nation's stake in the controversy").
117. HarrisRutsky, 328 F.3d at 1133 (noting sovereign interests but finding
that factor not controlling); Jet Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 298 F.3d
1, 12 (1st Cir. 2002) (mentioning, but not considering, foreign sovereign
interests when analyzing jurisdiction over a company from Lichtenstein and the
Bahamas); Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1501 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding
jurisdiction over an Austrian bank and rejecting an "international comity"
argument); Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1199 (explaining that foreign state interests do
not control); Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1333 (9th Cir. 1984)
(finding the sovereignty interests of a foreign state not controlling because "if
[this factor were] given controlling weight, it would always prevent suit against
a foreign national in a United States court").
118. Abramson, supra note 69, at 466 (footnote omitted).
119. Id. (footnote omitted).
120. Id.
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Reasons for the Assumption: Chance Not Choice

The reason why nonresident, alien defendants have been
treated essentially the same as domestic defendants is murky at
best. The Court's application of domestic jurisdictional standards to
alien defendants, however, appears not to have been the result of
considered reflection. The Court did not raise the issue of the Due
Process Clause's applicability in any of the four international cases
involving personal jurisdiction questions. 21 The parties themselves
1 22
seemed content to assume that the Due Process Clause applied.
Similarly, the academic community at the time of Asahi universally
assumed the Due Process123 Clause protected foreign defendants from

jurisdictional assertions.

The Court's assumption that due process considerations apply
to alien defendants may have been the result of scholarship, which
appears to have driven changes in how the Court analyzed
jurisdictional issues. In 1981, in his seminal article, Martin Redish
criticized the consideration of sovereignty concerns in any
jurisdictional analysis.12 1 Other academics agreed, arguing that the
personal jurisdiction analysis must be based solely on an overall
inquiry into the fairness to the defendant of conducting the
litigation in a particular forum.' 5

Russell J. Weintraub-a long-

121. See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Ins.
Corp. of Ir.v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); Perkins
v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
122. See, e.g., Brief of Respondent at 7-27, Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (No. 85-693) (arguing that the
requirements of the Due Process Clause were met); Brief of Petitioner at 13-15,
Asahi, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (No. 85-693) (arguing that although international
standards impose a further restraint on a state's power, the Due Process Clause
requirements were not met); see also Reply Brief of Cross-Respondent at 3-8,
Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982) (No.
81-440); Brief of Cross-Petitioner at 8, Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. 694 (1982) (No.
81-440); Reply Brief of Cross-Petitioner at 16, Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. 694
(1982) (No. 81-440).
123. See, e.g., Born, supra note 5, at 4; Degnan & Kane, supra note 15, at
799-800; Lilly, supra note 5, at 107; Toran, supra note 24, at 758.
124. Redish, supra note 20, at 1112.
125. See, e.g., Robert H. Abrams & Paul R. Dimond, Toward a Constitutional
Frameworkfor the Control of State Court Jurisdiction,69 MINN. L. REV. 75, 8389 (1984) (arguing that the Court should take due process seriously as the sole
source of authority for jurisdictional rules); Daan Braveman, Interstate
Federalism and Personal Jurisdiction, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 533, 534 (1982)
("[Tihe proper constitutional limitations on state judicial authority should be
derived from considerations of fairness and not from imaginary concerns about
interstate harmony."); John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal
Jurisdiction,68 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1065-66 (1983) (explaining that while "[tihe
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standing advocate to the fairness approach to jurisdiction-more
recently urged the Court to "reject once and for all the notion that
state sovereignty and state lines are important constants in the due
process calculus."'26 Scholars like Redish and Weintraub themselves
stand on the shoulders of legal realists, like Philip Kurland,
Geoffrey Hazard, Arthur T. von Mehren, and Donald T. Trautman,
who deconstructed the law of personal jurisdiction and pushed the
fairness as the touchstone
doctrine and academic analysis towards
17
for personal jurisdiction analysis.
Good reasons exist to believe the barrage of literature criticizing
the Court for not focusing solely on due process and fairness
considerations influenced the Court. Scholars suggest that the
Court's decision in Insurance Corp. of Ireland and its reemphasis on
due process was a direct response to Martin Redish's 1981 article,
which objected to the use of sovereignty factors in the personal
jurisdiction analysis. 28 That article and others like it, however, did
not consider whether foreign defendants should be treated
differently. 129 Likewise in Asahi, the decision appeared to embrace
recently published scholarship that for pragmatic reasons argued for
federalism theme is still part of personal jurisdiction," it is only a byproduct and
that the modem emphasis is correctly placed on personal due process rights);
Hazard, supra note 40, at 281-88 (arguing that state court jurisdiction should
not be a problem of state sovereignty); Lewis, supra note 66, at 724 (criticizing
reliance on state sovereignty in jurisdictional analysis); Weintraub, supra note
25, at 486 & n.14 (listing numerous scholars arguing that fairness and not
"invisible state lines" should limit a court's exercise of jurisdiction).
126. Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction
Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 548-49 (1995); cf. Arthur M. Weisburd,
Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 377, 379
(1985) (arguing that state-borderline-based territoriality should remain
relevant).
127. Rutherglen, supra note 40, at 350, 360-61. See generally Hazard, supra
note 40; Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the
In PersonamJurisdictionof State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review,
25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569 (1958); Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman,
Jurisdictionto Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966).
128. Condlin, supra note 3, at 79 n.163 & 88 n.229 (arguing that "[tihe
difficulty of justifying the use of sovereignty factors has been recognized for a
long time, but the Redish article made the objection too powerful to be ignored
any longer," and that in Insurance Corp. of Ireland the Court "would . . .agree
with Redish's argument, but without mentioning his article"); see also Winton
D. Woods, Burnham v. Superior Court, New Wine, Old Bottles, 13 GEO. MASON
U. L. REV. 199, 214 n.50 (1990) ("One of the classic examples of the interplay
between enigmatic Supreme Court doctrine and academic concern with
constitutional propriety is Professor Martin Redish's attack on Justice White's
doctrine of interstate federalism. In a famous article, Professor Redish forced a
hasty retreat.").
129. See supra note 125.
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30
heightened constitutional scrutiny in international cases.1

III. A LONG-OVERDUE EXAMINATION
Why courts and academics alike assume that nonresident aliens
have due process rights in the context of the personal jurisdiction
analysis is puzzling.
Equally puzzling are assertions that
sovereignty concerns-at least those untethered to the Due Process
Clause-are less relevant, if not irrelevant, to international cases.
Current constitutional doctrine and history supports neither
assumption.
A.

The Due Process Clause's Inapplicability

Nonresident foreign defendants generally do not enjoy due
process protections under the Constitution.
Putting aside the
uncritical assumption that plaintiffs may only haul nonresident
foreign corporations or individuals into American courts consistent
with due process, the Supreme Court has consistently refused to
provide foreign defendants located abroad, or not under U.S. control,
constitutional rights. 3 '
1.

Current ConstitutionalDoctrine

The case law is unambiguous and uniform. Although aliens are
"persons" for Constitutional purposes, 132 nonresident aliens obtain
constitutional protections only when they have some substantial
34
33
connection to the United States or are physically present here.
130. See, e.g., Born, supra note 5; Lilly, supra note 5; see also Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113, n.* (1987) (citing to
Professors Born's and Lilly's articles).
131. Even foreign criminal defendants who are forcibly abducted abroad are
not guaranteed due process rights. See Roberto Iraola, A Primeron Legal Issues
Surrounding the ExtraterritorialApprehension of Criminals, 29 AM. J. CRIM L.
1, 3-7 (2001).
132. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (stating that the Due
Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause are "universal in their application,
to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of ... nationality"); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982)
(finding that aliens are persons under the Fourteenth Amendment).
133. Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308, 317-319 (1952) (holding that
"friendly aliens" with property in the United States have rights to "just
compensation" for takings); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228 (1942)
(holding that nonresident aliens owning property within the United States are
entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment).
134. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) ("It is well established that
certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States
are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders."); United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273-75 (1990) (noting that illegal aliens in the
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Nonresident aliens seeking admittance to the United States may not
invoke the Due Process Clause's procedural protections.1 35 And the
Constitution generally has no extraterritorial effect.13 6 In fact, in
almost every context aliens-even
resident aliens-have less due
3
process rights than citizens.

1

United States have Fourth Amendment rights but that aliens outside the U.S.
borders do not enjoy constitutional protections); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210-12
(finding that illegal aliens, present in the United States, are entitled to
protection under the Equal Protection Clause and that the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment "'are universal in their application, to all persons
within the territorialjurisdiction'"(quoting Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369)); Kwong
Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953) ("The Bill of Rights is a futile
authority for the alien seeking admission for the first time to these shores. But
once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested
with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our
borders." (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J.,
concurring))); Yick Wo,118 U.S. at 369 (holding that aliens in the United States
enjoy the same rights as citizens). For a seminal discussion of the federal power
over immigration and alienage rights, see Louis Henkin, The Constitution and
United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100
HARv.L. REV. 853 (1987).
135. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)
(internal citations omitted); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713
(1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892)
136. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 738; see also United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) ("Neither the Constitution nor
the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in
respect of our own citizens."). The Supreme Court has resisted applying the
Constitution globally. See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922)
(finding that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial did not apply in Puerto
Rico); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914) (finding that the Fifth
Amendment grand jury provisions were inapplicable in the Philippines); Dorr v.
United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904) (holding jury trial provisions
inapplicable in Philippines); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 215-16 (1903)
(finding grand jury and jury trial provisions inapplicable in Hawaii). Notions of
territorial sovereignty have traditionally restrained U.S. courts from applying
constitutional principles abroad. Kal Raustiala, The Evolution of Territoriality:
InternationalRelations and American Law, in TERRITORIALITY AND CONFLICT IN
AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (Miles Kahler & Barbara Walter eds., forthcoming
2006) [hereinafter Raustiala, Evolution of Territoriality], available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=700244; see also Kal Raustiala, The Geography of
Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2506 (2005) ("[Tlhe protections of the Bill of
Rights are not untethered from the territory of the United States. Rather, they
are spatially bound: operative only within the fifty states and other territories
unequivocally possessed by the United States.") [hereinafter Raustialia,
Geography of Justice].
137. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (stating that Congress
often makes rules in naturalization and immigration that would not be accepted
if applied to citizens); Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273 (noting that prior
decisions held certain constitutional provisions were not intended to apply to
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The Supreme Court's analysis in United States v. VerdugoUrquidez138 is instructive.

That case involved a Mexican resident

and citizen, whom U.S. drug enforcement authorities arrested in
Mexico. 9 Following the arrest, the drug enforcement officers
searched the defendant's Mexican residence without a warrant. 4 °
The defendant moved in federal court to suppress the evidence,
claiming that the search violated the Fourth Amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.'
The
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the Fourth Amendment does
not protect noncitizens living abroad.'
Noting that its "rejection of
extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment" has been
"emphatic" the Court explained that "aliens receive constitutional
protections [only] when they have come within the territory of the
United States4 3 and [have] developed substantial connections with
this country.",

The court's earlier declaration in Johnson v. Eisentrager4 4 was
essentially the same: it rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to
Fifth Amendment protections outside U.S. sovereign territory. 145
The Court explained that the constitutional text does not support
applying the Fifth Amendment extraterritorially to aliens and that
doing so would produce undesirable consequences, and would be
aliens in the same way as applied to citizens); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 7980 (1976) ("In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and
immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if
applied to citizens."). See generally DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 85-179 (2003)
(describing how, in the name of national security, the government has taken
extreme measures against noncitizens, defending those measures on the ground
that noncitizens deserve only diminished constitutional protections).
138. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
139. Id. at 262.

140. Id.
141. Id. at 263.
142. Id. at 265-71. The concurring opinions also make very clear that aliens
outside

U.S. jurisdiction

and control are

not entitled to constitutional

protections. Id. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[Tihe Constitution does not
create, nor do general principles of law create, any juridical relation between
our country and some undefined, limitless class of noncitizens who are beyond
our territory."); id. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[Alliens who are lawfully
present in the United States are among those 'people' who are entitled to the
protection of the Bill of Rights.").
143. Id. at 269-71; see also United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 251 (9th
Cir. 1990) (holding that nonresident aliens on ships in international waters
have no Fourth Amendment protections).
144. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
145. Id. at 771; see also Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case),
189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903) (describing plenary power of Congress to exclude
nonresident aliens without judicial review).
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unprecedented. 4 6 In short, "[a] foreign entity without property or
presence in this country has no constitutional rights, under the due
process clause or otherwise." 47 Only "as ties to the United
States
148
deepen, [do] constitutional protections deepen as well."

Recent cases similarly underscore why foreign defendants, not
present in the United States, do not enjoy due process rights. In
2003, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that only aliens within the U.S.49
territory are "persons" entitled to Due Process Clause protections.
Two years earlier, in 2001, the Court was equally clear that "certain
constitutional protections available to persons inside the United
States are unavailable to aliens outside our geographic borders." 0
The lower courts are similarly consistent. In recent cases
alleging torture and illegal detention at GuantAnamo Bay, courts
that have found detainees entitled to fundamental constitutional
rights have done so because "Guantdnamo Bay must be considered
the equivalent of a U.S. territory."' 5 Courts that have reached the
146. Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 782-84.
147. People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C.
Cir. 1999); see also Jifry v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("The
Supreme Court has long held that non-resident aliens who have insufficient
contacts with the United States are not entitled to Fifth Amendment
protections."); 32 County Sovereignty Comm. v. Dep't of State, 292 F.3d 797,
799 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding that Irish political organizations were not entitled
to due process before being designated as terrorist organizations because the
organizations did not have "substantial connections" to the United States.);
United States v. Husband R. (Roach), 453 F.2d 1054, 1058 (5th Cir. 1971) ("In
areas under the jurisdiction of the United States to which the Fifth Amendment
is applicable, an alien is entitled to its protection to the same extent as a
citizen."); Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252, 254 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ("The nonresident aliens here plainly cannot appeal to the protection of the Constitution
or laws of the United States." (citing Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 763 )).
148.

Raustiala, Geography of Justice, supra note 136, at 2553; see also

Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770 ("The alien, to whom the United States has been
traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of
rights as he increases his identity with our society."); Raustiala, Geography of
Justice, supra note 136, at 2550-53 (criticizing, but acknowledging the current
approach tied to geography, and arguing for a "Global Constitution").
149. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 543 (2003).
150. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). In a parenthetical citing
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 256, 269 (1990), the Court noted,

"[the] Fifth Amendment's protections do not extend to aliens outside the [U.S.]
territorial boundaries." Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693.
151. In re Guantdnamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 464 (D.D.C.
2005); see also Almurbati v. Bush, 366 F. Supp. 2d 72, 80 n.6 (D.D.C. 2005)
(citing In re Guantdnamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 464). See
generally Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional
Methodology After Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2073, 2073 (2005) (noting

that the U.S. Supreme Court's Rasul opinion "strongly suggests in a footnote
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opposite conclusion do so because they find the detainees to be
No court has found nonresident
outside sovereign U.S. territory.
aliens entitled to constitutional protections when1 53not in U.S.
sovereign territory or under U.S. governing authority.
Scholars, while perhaps rightfully criticizing the lack of
constitutional protections provided aliens, concede that current law
does not accord aliens abroad due process rights.1 54 Theoretically,
this approach has appeal: "[t]o the extent that the Constitution is a
social contract establishing a system of self-government, permanent
outsiders155 . . . seem to have little claim to invoke 'constitutional

rights."'

that foreign nationals in U.S. custody at Guantinamo Bay Naval Base ...
possess constitutional rights" but explaining that the decision is unclear
whether this is because the detainees "are human beings in long-term U.S.
custody or because of the special character of U.S. authority at Guantdnamo").
152. See, e.g., Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 321-23 (D.D.C. 2005).
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision last June in Rasul v. Bush, lower courts
denied Guantinamo Bay detainees the right to file habeas petitions because
they were "detained outside the geographic boundaries of the United States"
and therefore lacked legal protection. Raustiala, Geography of Justice, supra
note 136, at 2502 (citing Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1140-41 (D.C.
Cir. 2003); Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 320-23); Coal. of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F.
Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Sean D. Murphy, ed., Contemporary Practiceof
the United States Relating to InternationalLaw: Ability of Detainees in Cuba to
Obtain Habeas CorpusReview, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 481 (2002); see also Cuban Am.

Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1417, 1428-29 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding
that Haitian and Cuban aliens outside U.S. territory could not assert various
statutory and constitutional rights).
153. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484-85 (2004) (discussing Al Odah and
Eisentrager and whether aliens have Constitutional rights when the United
States exercises sufficient governing authority). Not only does the Constitution
not guarantee aliens due process, but Congress has chosen also to deny due
process rights to aliens who are charged with illegally entering the United
States. See generally Larry Kupers, Aliens Charged with Illegal Re-Entry are
Denied Due Process and, Thereby, Equal Treatment Under the Law, 38 U.C.

DAVIS L. REV. 861, 862-63 (2005).
154. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 134, at 858-63 (describing-with
distaste-that it is possible to read controlling precedent as providing for no
constitutional scrutiny of Congressionally imposed restrictions on alien entry);
see also ALEINIKOFF, supra note 44, at 66-73 (describing how the Rehnquist
Court focused on citizenship and individual, personal rights rather than on
group-based rights and as a result not recognized rights for nonresident aliens);
ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF

53 (1985) ("Once aliens are within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, however, the situation changes dramatically: They are then
entitled to most of the rights guaranteed in the Constitution. The importance of
'territorial presence' is thus overriding.... ."); Neuman, supra note 151, at 2077
(explaining that aliens abroad are not accorded constitutional protections).
155. Lori Fisler Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 VA. L.
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Given the Supreme Court's pronouncements, the notion that
nonresident alien defendants can assert due process protections
within the context of personal jurisdiction leads to an inexplicable
result. Aliens abroad with no connection to the United States have
no constitutional rights but, under current personal jurisdictional
law, paradoxically have the strongest claim that the Due Process
Clause prohibits a U.S. court from asserting jurisdiction over them.
Conversely, aliens with substantial U.S. connections are entitled to
constitutional protections but cannot resist jurisdictional assertions
because, if they have substantial connections, they certainly must
meet the minimum contacts test. Gary Haugen has aptly summed
up the "Court's 'Catch-22':' 5 6
The result is the legal equivalent of the "Gift of the Magi"what the Due Process Clause gives away, it destroys in the
giving.

.

.

.

[Allien defendants who need the "minimum

contacts" test the most-those with no substantial connections
to the United States-are the ones who, under VerdugoUrquidez, cannot claim this constitutional protection.5 7
The suggestion-that aliens abroad may claim due process
protections only in those circumstances when the protections are of
no use, i.e., when the alien defendant has sufficient contacts to
justify assertion of jurisdiction-seems illogical, if not absurd. The
more palatable conclusion, to avoid this doctrinal incoherence, is
that under current constitutional doctrine nonresident aliens do not
have due process rights.
The conclusion advanced here, that the Fourteenth and Fifth
Amendments do not protect foreign defendants from jurisdictional
assertions, is consistent with history. Several academics have
convincingly argued that the Framers never intended the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to limit territorial
assertions of power even in the domestic context.158 "[Tihe phrases

REV.483, 487 (1987).

156. Haugen, supra note 12, at 117.
157. Id. at 115-16.
158. See Borchers, supra note 23, at 20 (arguing that the Court should
"abandon the notion that state court personal jurisdiction is a matter of
constitutional law, and relinquish its role as the final authority on the general
ability of state courts to reach beyond their borders"); Conison, supranote 31, at
1073-76 (describing in detail the constitutionalizing of personal jurisdiction law
and stating that the constitutional law of personal jurisdiction is "spurious");
Linda Silberman, Reflections on Burnham v. Superior Court: Toward
Presumptive Rules of Jurisdiction and Implications for Choice of Law, 22
RUTGERS L.J. 569, 582 n.68 (1991) (decrying the constitutional character of the

personal jurisdiction analysis); see also Trangsrud, supra note 27, at 876-80;
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'due process of law,' and its Magna Carta equivalent 'law of the
land,' did not connote any limitation on personal jurisdiction....
[NIothing in the history of the adoption of the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment suggests a departure from the preratification
understanding of the term 'due process.""59 To the extent that this
academic scholarship is compelling, its logic applies with greater
force when the case involves a foreign defendant. One professor,
Andrew Strauss, has even argued that international law is the only
limit on a court's jurisdiction. 160 The Constitution, in the context of
foreign defendants, specifically "defers to international law to
prescribe jurisdiction among the nation-states of the world." 6'
2.

Responding to Counterarguments

No scholarship directly explains why aliens are currently
entitled to due process protection from extraterritorial jurisdictional
assertions. Gary Born, in the late 1980s, argued that heightened
constitutional scrutiny is required in alien jurisdiction cases, for a
host of policy reasons. 162 Similarly, Arthur von Mehren and Donald
Trautman have argued that because of the difficulties in enforcing
judgments abroad, jurisdiction over aliens should face more
stringent judicial scrutiny.63 But these scholars do not explain why
constitutional protections apply. Instead, they identify several
pragmatic reasons why courts should be careful not to interpret
their jurisdictional reaches broadly.6 4 These scholars are certainly
Whitten, supra note 33, at 799-804; cf Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due
Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 368-70 (1910-1911)
(describing the history of due process); Lowell J. Howe, The Meaning of "Due
Process of Law" Priorto the Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, 18 CAL. L.
REV. 583 (1930) (describing the history and meaning of Due Process).
159. Borchers, supra note 23, at 88.
160. Strauss, supra note 24, at 1239.
161. Id. at 1242; see also id. at 1263 ("[U]nder the Constitution, the
international order governs relations between nation-states, and that
international jurisdiction, including contacts jurisdiction, is about allocating
authority between nation-states.").
162. Born, supra note 5, at 21-44; see also Holly A. Ellencrig, Comment,
Expanding PersonalJurisdictionOver ForeignDefendants: A Response to Omni

Capital International v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 24 CAL. W. INVL L.J. 363, 374
(1994) (arguing for "heightened constitutional scrutiny of [a] defendant's
contacts and the standard of fair play and substantial justice because of the
'greater litigation burdens' that a foreign defendant must bear" (footnotes
omitted)).
163. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 127, at 1127-28.
Some
commentators have reached the opposite conclusion. Weinberg, supra note 82,
at 931-34, 945-46 (arguing for more expansive jurisdiction over alien defendants
as compared to domestic defendants).
164. See, e.g., Born, supra note 5, at 21-43.
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correct in their conclusion that asserting jurisdiction over foreigners
raises unique problems that call for judicial restraint-a conclusion
the U.S. Supreme Court endorses. 1 ' Yet, no matter how many
sensible reasons exist to constrain jurisdiction, no doctrinally
coherent reason appears to elevate the analysis to one of
constitutional concern.
Two explanations for why personal jurisdiction cases are
distinguishable from other alien cases have been suggested, but
neither explanation is satisfactory.
The first argues that
jurisdictional issues are different because the Due Process Clause
acts as a restraint on a U.S. court exercising power in the United
States, and, therefore, no extraterritorial application of the
Constitution exists. 16 6 But current law and constitutional theory
does not support this distinction. In Verdugo-Urquidez, for example,
the issue was whether to suppress, in a U.S. trial, evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 67 The Court focused not on
whether the Fourth Amendment restricted the U.S. court from
admitting evidence unconstitutionally seized, but on individual
rights. 16 The Court avoided finding any constitutional violation by
holding that aliens abroad do not have constitutional rights. 169 In
fact, Justice Brennan's dissent specifically argued that "[t]he focus
of the Fourth Amendment [should be] on what the Government can
and cannot do, and how it may act, not on against whom these
actions may be taken."170 The majority, however, declined to adopt

this approach.'
Moreover, it would be particularly peculiar to find that due
process protections inure to aliens because the Due Process Clause
limits a court's power to hear cases. That suggestion has been
widely rejected in the domestic context. Historically, the restrictions
on personal jurisdiction have, as described above, 172 focused on the
individual. "That is, such rights exist to shield individuals from
government actions; they do not divest the government of

165. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990).
166. Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritorialityand Fifth
Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1235 (1992).
167. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 263.
168. Id. at 288 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the majority opinion's
focus on individual rights).
169.

See generally GERALD L. NEUMAN,

STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION:

IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw

105-06

(1996) (describing the

Verdugo-Urquidez case).
170. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 288 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (contrasting the focus on what and how with the against whom
approach adopted by the majority).
172. See infra Parts II.B, II.C.1.
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competence to act." 173 If due process operated as an independent
restriction on the court's sovereign power to act, rather than as an
individual right, "it would not be possible to waive the personal
jurisdiction requirement: Individual actions cannot change the
powers of sovereignty."174 As many have observed, while "private
defendants should be in a position to waive their own rights, they
should hardly be given the power to forfeit the sovereign
prerogatives of state governments."' 5 A court, however,
can accept
176
jurisdiction based entirely on a defendant's consent.
A second explanation for the different treatment is that civil
defendants are passive participants: they seek "neither entrance
into the United States nor any benefit under our laws." 77 But why
an active/passive distinction is relevant for constitutional purposes
is unclear. Nothing in the Constitution's language suggests this
distinction. 178 Also obscure is why a defendant in a civil case would
be considered more passive than an enemy alien or an alien
undergoing deportation proceedings. A foreign civil defendant has
almost always done something to initiate the litigation in the United
States-e.g., sold a product into the United States.
Or put
differently, how "active" are the Guantdnamo Bay detainees, who
seek neither entrance to the United States nor the benefits of our
laws but who are being held involuntarily? Perhaps more fatal is
that the passive/active distinction mirrors what has been referred to
as the "mutuality of obligation" approach to constitutionalism, most
commonly associated with Gerald Neuman's writings.179 In that
approach, foreign nationals obtain constitutional rights when "the
United States seeks to impose and enforce its own law."8 ° But that
173. A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial
Legislation?,35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 379, 385 (1997).
174. Ins. Corp. of Ir.v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
702 n.10 (1982).
175. Maltz, supra note 3, at 688.
176. Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 703; see also Lewis, supra note 66, at 727
(arguing that "the sole proper concern of the due process clause in the personal
jurisdiction setting is with the interests of the individual litigants," and not
with state government interests); Redish, supra note 20, at 1143 (observing that
the "sole concern" of due process should be the "prevention of injustice to the
individual").
177. Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 166, at 1238-39 (1992); see also
Weisburd, supra note 173, at 404 (distinguishing cases where alien litigants are
passive actors "rather than seeking something affirmative from their
opponents").
178. U.S. CONST. amends. V, § 1 & XIV, § 1.
179. NEUMAN, supra note 169, at 108; Neuman, supra note 151, at 2076-77;
Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 981-90 (1991).
180. Neuman, supra note 151, at 2077; see also NEUMAN, supra note 169, at
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approach-although perhaps desirable-is decidedly not the law. 8'
Even advocates of that approach acknowledge this. 8 2
This is not to approve of the current constitutional doctrine,
which denies nonresident aliens constitutional rights. 83 Instead,
the point is that the Court's current due process formulations in the
jurisdictional context are incoherent with its approach to U.S.
constitutionalism in other contexts. Another approach might well be
a welcome development. Gerald Neuman's "mutuality of obligation"
approach may be preferable over the current territorially-connected
constitutional analysis.184
Or alternatively, Kal Raustiala has
argued for a "global constitution," urging the Court to stop
"cling[ing] to the notion that American law is tethered to territorythat individual rights ebb and flow based on where the individual is
physically located." 85
Under Raustiala's global constitution,
geography would be decoupled from justice: "that where the
government exercises power, that exercise is presumed to operate
without regard to territorial location and is always subject to

108 ("[T]he mutuality of obligation approach affords the express protections of
fundamental law, to the extent that their terms permit, as a condition for
subjecting a person to the nation's law.").
181. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 288 (1990) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (urging Court to use a mutuality principle).
182. Neuman, supra note 151, at 2077; cf. Raustiala, Evolution of
Territoriality,supra note 136.
183. Even putting aside constitutional considerations, good reasons exist to
criticize the Bush Administration's handling of GuantAnamo Bay detainees,
which appears to deny those detainees basic fundamental rights under U.S. and
international law. See generally Diane Marie Amann, Guantdnamo, 42 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263 (2004) (exploring whether detention, interrogation, and
treatment of detainees violates human and constitutional rights); Laura A.
Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military
Commissions, InternationalTribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
1407, 1412-32 (2002) (describing objections to detentions based on international
law and the U.S. Constitution); Joan Fitzpatrick, Sovereignty, Territoriality,
and the Rule of Law, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 303, 303 (2002)
(criticizing the Bush Administration's policy on human rights and other
grounds); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, InternationalLaw, U.S. War Powers,
and the Global War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2653 (2005) (discussing the
presidential power to designate and detain enemy combatants, and try them by
special military tribunal); Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by
the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97 (2004) (evaluating the Bush
Administration's claim that it is not bound by the Geneva Conventions in
regard to detainees held at Guantdnamo Bay, and finding the President's
position spurious). This Article should not be read as either indirectly or
implicitly endorsing the Bush Administration's approach to enemy aliens.
184. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
185. Raustiala, Evolution of Territoriality,supra note 136.
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Constitutional restrictions."'' 6 Raustiala proposes that "courts ought
to treat any person that comes within the power of the United
States as at least presumptively in possession of the full gamut of
[constitutional] protections reasonably applicable under the
circumstances."81 7 But as Neuman, Raustiala, and others are quick

to concede: these alternatives are "not currently the law for foreign
nationals."'8 And the Court has shown no inclination to change its
longstanding jurisprudence.
B.

Sovereignty's ContinuingRelevance

Not only do nonresident, foreign aliens not have due process
rights, the other assumption that underlies conventional personal
jurisdiction analysis in the domestic context-that sovereignty plays
little or no role-is a flawed assumption when the case involves
foreign defendants. This is not to engage in the debate whether
sovereignty (often referred to as federalism) should play a greater
role in domestic personal jurisdiction cases.'8 9 "There is no reason to
assume that the scope of legitimate judicial authority of the United
States as it operates in the international community is essentially
parallel to the scope of the authority of each of our individual
states." 190 Nor is it an attempt to contribute to the burgeoning
literature debating sovereignty's continuing importance, given the
rise of international institutions and interdependence. 9 ' Instead, it
is to state a truism: sovereignty remains the governing92principle
under international law limiting jurisdictional assertions. 1

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Neuman, supra note 151, at 2077; see also Raustiala, Evolution of
Territoriality,supra note 136 (arguing the claim that the "Constitution is not
presumptively spatially-delimited may seem radical but is not fanciful").
189. For a new article arguing that state interests and sovereignty should
play a prominent role in domestic personal jurisdiction analysis, see A.
Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate:A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. (forthcoming Spring 2006).
190. Perdue, supra note 26, at 461.
191. See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 3 (1999).
See generally Louis Henkin, Lecture, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and
Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1999);
Jenik Radon, Sovereignty: A Political Emotion, not a Concept, 40 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 195 (2004) (exploring the conflicting notion of sovereignty); Kal Raustiala,
Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law, 6 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 841, 841-42 & n.1 (2003) (listing examples of the "voluminous"
literature analyzing sovereignty and "its relationship to international economic
institutions").
192. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 287-88 (6th
ed. 2003).
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The sovereign state remains "the basic unit of political
separation into which the global community divides itself. 1 93 "The
international regime of nation states is not about to collapse[,]" and
"[niational sovereignty may be somewhat less secure these days, but
it is still the strongest game in town."1 94 Alexander Aleinikoff has
described sovereignty's continuing importance this way:
It is important that [national sovereignty remain secure] ...
[T]he state remains "the main mechanism for social transfers,
that is to say for collecting an appropriate fraction of the
economy's total income ...

and redistributing it among the

population according to some criterion of public interest,
common welfare and social needs." It is also "the best unit we
have ...from the point of view of democratic politics, for which

supranational, transnational and global authorities provide
little or no real space." 95
Accordingly, "[a]lthough much criticized, the concept of 'sovereignty'
is still central to most thinking about international relations and
particularly international law.1 96
The theory of nation-state sovereignty, at least its basic
contours, is well understood. Sovereignty implies independence,
"that is the right to exercise, within a portion of the globe and to the
exclusion of other States, the functions of a State such as the
exercise of jurisdiction and enforcement of laws over persons
therein.' 97 Because each nation possesses exclusive jurisdiction
within its territory, in theory, each nation shares an equality with
other nations, 98 despite economic or military distinctions. 99 In other
words, sovereignty-at least that version known as Westphalian
sovereignty2°°_,,iS the right to be left alone, to exclude, to be free
193. Strauss, supra note 84, at 406.
194. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 44, at 194.
195. Id. (quoting E.J. Hobsbawm, The Future of the State, 27 DEV. & CHANGE
267, 276-77 (1996)).
196. John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated
Concept, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 782 (2003).
197.

DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

379 (2d ed. 2002); see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 183, at 308-09.
198. The doctrine of state equality can be traced back to theorists such as
Hobbes and Bodin. See THOMAs

HOBBES, LEVIATHAN

9-10 (Richard Tuck ed.,

Cambridge University Press 1991) (1651); JEAN BODIN, Six BOOKS
COMMONWEALTH 7-8 (M.J. Tooley trans., 1955) (1576).

OF THE

199. BROWNLIE, supra note 192, at 287; see also The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825) ("No principle of general law is more universally
acknowledged, than the perfect equality of nations. . . . It results from this
equality, that no one can rightfully impose a rule upon another.").
200. For discussions of Westphalian sovereignty, see Raustiala, supra note
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[I]t is also the right

to be recognized as an autonomous agent in the international
system, capable of interacting with other states and entering into

international agreements.,, 211

"The sovereignty and equality of

states represent the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of
nations;" there exists a "duty of non-intervention in the area of
exclusive jurisdiction of other states."2 °2 Personal jurisdiction in
international law-as opposed to U.S. law-thus unsurprisingly is a
doctrine concerned with this allocation of sovereign authority.2 2°
Under domestic law, it may well be appropriate to find that
sovereignty plays little or no role in the personal jurisdiction
analysis.0 4 States within the United States no longer retain the
sovereign independence they once did:
The United States today is very different from the way it was
at the time of the Constitution's framing. The jealousies
among states are not nearly as great as they once were, and it
no longer seems appropriate-if it ever was-to view the
relations among the states as analogous to the relations among
foreign nations. 205

191, at 874-78; see also MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 153-62 (2d ed. 1993) (describing Thomas Hobbes' conception of sovereignty
and the Peace of Westphalia).
201. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World
Order, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 283, 284 (2004).
202. BROWNLIE, supra note 192, at 287; see also JANIS, supra note 200, at
330-50. The classic statement of comity can be found in Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895):
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation,
on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.
But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to
the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of
its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws.
203. Perdue, supra note 26, at 457-63 (arguing that personal jurisdiction is a
doctrine that allocates sovereign authority and reviewing laws in the European
Union to support argument).
204. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957) (noting the
"fundamental transformation of our national economy"); see also CLERMONT,
supra note 9, at 11-12 ("The common law of territorial jurisdiction has evolved
largely in response to socio-economic-political pressures, as well as changes in
technology and even philosophy."). See generally Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 325 (1816) (noting that "the sovereign powers vested in
state governments, by their respective constitutions, remained unaltered and
unimpaired, except so far as they were granted to the government of the United
States").
205. Redish, supra note 20, at 1136. Admittedly, even academics like Redish
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"Indeed, one of the very purposes of the Constitution was to alter the
relations of the states so that they would no longer interact as the
equivalent of separation [sic] nations."2 °6
In the international context, however, "any extraterritorial
exercise of jurisdiction potentially infringes on the sovereignty of
another state., 20 7 Accordingly, extraterritorial conduct is subject to a
state's jurisdiction under international law only when:
*

A "substantial and bona fide connection" between the
subject-matter and the jurisdiction's source exists;

*

The "principle of non-intervention in the domestic or
territorial jurisdiction of other states" is observed; and

"

The principles of accommodation,
proportionality are applied.

mutuality,

and

Several scholars have explained well why jurisdictional limits are
inherently a product of international law.20 9 Interestingly, unlike
U.S. law, which focuses extensively on the "reasonableness" of
asserting jurisdiction, S• international
law's
"reasonableness"
f.
210
requirement is quite different.

would concede that the Constitution intended to preserve some measure of
sovereign independence for the States. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 71315 (1999) (describing the retained sovereignty of the states within the federal
system); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 907 (3d ed.
2000) (noting how the Constitution presupposes the existence of states as
independent sovereign entities). As James Madison explained, states retain "a
residuary and inviolable sovereignty." THE FEDERALIST, No. 39, at 198 (James
Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) (applying
international law principles to the sovereignty of the several states of the
Union).
206. Redish, supra note 20, at 1136 n.156 (citing THE FEDERALIST Nos. 6-8,
at 27-47 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bicentennial ed. 1976)); see also Steven G. Gey,
The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601, 1601-02 (2002) (exploring
the extent that states retain sovereignty in the federal system).
207. Halverson, supra note 12, at 149.
208. BROWNLIE, supra note 192, at 309; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 421 (1986). For a detailed
discussion of jurisdictional principles under international law, see JANIS, supra
note 200, at 330-50.
209. Halverson, supra note 12, at 148-52; Strauss, Beyond National Law,
supra note 84, at 408.
210. Perdue, supra note 26, at 469 ("As the earlier discussion indicates,
other countries do not appear to engage in an open-ended "reasonableness"
inquiry...."); Linda J. Silberman, JudicialJurisdictionin the Conflict of Laws
Course:Adding a Comparative Dimension, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 396
(1995) ("I do not think that any fair reading of jurisdictional law in the member
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RETHINKING PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER
NONRESIDENT ALIEN DEFENDANTS

The foregoing discussion has attempted to show that the two
assumptions girding the current approach to jurisdictional questions
(i.e., the dominance of due process and the rejection of state
sovereignty) are unsupported when the case involves a nonresident,
alien defendant. The minimum contacts test, however, has been
with us for over a half century, and the Court has never evinced an
interest in reexamining its fundamental tenets. Given that reality,
what should be done?
A.

The Stakes

Before describing a proposal for change, what is at stake is
important to understand.
Articulating a personal jurisdiction
doctrine for nonresident, alien defendants that is doctrinally sound
is not a purely academic exercise; the impact is significant.
1.
Unique Burdens, Foreign Relations, and International
Trade
Whether a U.S. court should exercise personal jurisdiction over
an alien defendant raises a host of collateral issues, unique to
international litigation. As a preliminary matter, the number of
international cases continues to grow, which makes the jurisdiction
question an important one.21' This increase is an inevitable "feature
of the modern global economy." 212 The tremendous expansion of the
states of the European Union or of the Brussels Convention establishes
anything like the amorphous reasonableness standard that has been elevated to
constitutional principle by the United States Supreme Court.").
211. Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1456,
1456 (1991) (noting that international litigation is of "increasing practical
importance and substantial theoretical interest"); Degnan & Kane, supra note
15, at 799 ("It is trite but true to observe that disputes between United States
nationals and people from other lands have been increasing steadily and
doubtless will continue to do so."); Trek C. Doyle & Roberto Calvo Ponton, The
Renaissance of the Foreign Action and a PracticalResponse, 33 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 293, 294 (2002) (observing that "[flactually, there has been a dramatic
increase in the number of foreign actions being brought in Texas and
elsewhere"); Lilly, supra note 5, at 116 ("The flourishing activity of
international commerce has resulted in increased numbers of claims against
alien defendants brought in American courts."); Eugene J. Silva, Practical
Views on Stemming the Tide of ForeignPlaintiffs and Concluding Mid-Atlantic
Settlements, 28 TEX. INT'L L.J. 479, 480 (1993) ("Over the last fifteen years,
however, multinational litigation has demonstrated particularly sustained
growth.").
212. Raymond Paretzky, A New Approach to Jurisdictional Questions in
Transnational Litigation in U.S. Courts, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L. Bus. L. 663, 663
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Internet has also contributed to the proliferation of transnational
litigation, as U.S. citizens and aliens are able to easily interact even
when the alien has no physical connection to the United States.1 2 In
2003, an Austrian professor summed up the issue nicely:
Because of the globalization process in trade and commerce,
the global liberalization of cross-border sales of goods and
supply of services under GATT and GATS, and the increasing
use of electronic means of communication in international
transactions, a just and predictable solution of the various
problems emerging from transatlantic litigation has become
214
even more urgent.
Concomitant with this growth of international cases has been the
recent prevalence of parallel proceedings abroad215 and international
class actions,216 which raise their own set of unique problems.
(1988); see also Born, supra note 5, at 5 ("The post-War era's expansion of
international trade fueled a dramatic increase in legal disputes between United

States citizens and foreign persons.").
213. Berman, supra note 16, at 330-33 (exploring the impact of globalization
and the Internet and its implications for jurisdiction); Moritz Keller, Lessons for
The Hague: Internet Jurisdiction in Contract and Tort Cases in the European
Community and the United States, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 15
(2004) ("With the increasing popularity of the Internet, multinational litigation,
involving the Internet, has dramatically increased.").
214. Willibald Posch, Resolving Business Disputes Through Litigation or
Other Alternatives: The Effects of JurisdictionalRules and Recognition Practice,
26 Hous. J. INT'L L. 363, 367 (2004).
215. Louise Ellen Teitz, Both Sides of the Coin: A Decade of Parallel
Proceedings and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Transnational
Litigation, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 3-15 (2004) (describing the increase
of parallel proceedings, the race to file, and the problems with concurrent
jurisdiction in international cases); see also Daniel G. Murphy et al., Parallel
Proceedings:Moving into Cyberspace, 35 INT'L LAw. 491, 493-95 (2001) (noting

the increasingly transnational character of daily transactions and the likelihood
of litigants becoming embroiled in parallel litigation as a result of the Internet's
growth); Linda J. Silberman, The Impact of Jurisdictional Rules and
Recognition Practice on InternationalBusiness Transactions:The U.S. Regime,
26 Hous. J. INT'L L. 327, 339-46 (2004) (exploring the means to address and deal
with parallel international litigation).
216. For scholarship discussing the phenomenon, see generally Debra Lyn
Bassett, Implied "Consent" to Personal Jurisdiction in Transnational Class
Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 619 (discussing the need for additional
measures to protect due process in the transnational context, concluding that
the traditional concept of personal jurisdiction does not apply, and advocating
for an procedure whereby non-U.S. litigants could opt-in to binding U.S. class
litigation as a solution) [hereinafter Bassett, Implied "Consent]; Debra Lyn
Bassett, U.S. Class Actions Go Global: Transnational Class Actions and
Personal Jurisdiction, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 41 (2003) (exploring the impact of
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The growth in international litigation is in part attributable to
plaintiffs preferring to choose U.S. courts rather than foreign courts
to resolve their disputes. The nature of the American judicial
system makes it so:
Courts in the United States attract plaintiffs, both foreign and
resident, because they offer procedural advantages beyond
those of foreign forums: the existence of civil juries, the
availability of broad discovery, easier access to courts and
lawyers, contingent fee arrangements,
and the absence of
S 217
"loser-pay-all" cost-shifting rules.
Other reasons exist for this plaintiff preference for U.S. litigation.
In some areas, such as products liability, U.S. law appears to favor
plaintiffs more than other foreign regimes. 2 ' Getting a case into a
non-U.S. citizens' participation in U.S. class actions); Janet Walker,
CrossborderClass Actions: A View From Across the Border, 2004 MICH. ST. L.

REV. 755 (studying the international approaches to transnational class action
litigation and the vagrancies of such litigation); Jack B. Weinstein, Mass Tort
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in a Multinational World Communicating by
Extraterrestrial Satellites, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 145 (2001) (offering fair

venue as the controlling principle to decide jurisdictional and choice of law
issues in mass tort transnational litigation).
217. Silberman, supra note 24, at 502 (footnotes omitted); see also Silva,
supra note 211, at 481 ("[Lliberal United States discovery rules, choice of law
analyses, and pro-plaintiff tort laws [among other reasons] attract foreign
litigants." (footnotes omitted)); Russell J. Weintraub, International Litigation
and Forum Non Conveniens, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 321, 323 (1994) (noting that U.S.
forums "offer a plaintiff both lower costs and higher recovery" because of
extensive pretrial discovery, plaintiff-friendly liability laws, plaintiff favorable
choice of law rules, and trial by jury); David Boyce, Note, ForeignPlaintiffs and
Forum Non Conveniens: Going Beyond Reyno, 64 TEX. L. REV. 193, 196-204
(1985) (explaining in depth the advantages to plaintiffs of suing in the United
States). See generally Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and

International, 63 TuL. L. REV. 553, 560-64 (1989) (discussing perceived
advantages for plaintiffs in U.S. litigation).
218. Silberman, supra note 26, at 502. See generally Michael N. Meller,
Costs are Killing PatentHarmonization, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 211
(1997) (describing how U.S. patent litigation offers injunctive relief and damage
awards significantly greater than those available in Japan and Europe); Glenn
R. Sarno, Haling Foreign Subsidiary Corporations into Court Under the 1934
Act: JurisdictionalBases and Forum Non Conveniens, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,

Autumn 1992, at 379 (discussing the increase of suits against foreign
nonresident defendants for securities law violations); Phil Rothenberg, Note,
Japan'sNew Product Liability Law: Achieving Modest Success, 31 LAw & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 453 (2000) (describing the differences between U.S. and Japanese law

and the failure of Japanese law to provide punitive damages); Marcy Sheinwold,
Comment, InternationalProducts Liability Law, 1 TOURO. J. TRASNAT'L L. 257
(1988) (comparing U.S., European, and Japanese products liability law and
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U.S. court can be outcome determinative.219 Consistent with the old
clich6, "[a]s a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the
United States. If he can only get his case into their courts, he
stands to win a fortune."22 °
Conversely, as much as plaintiffs often prefer U.S.-styled
litigation, foreigners do not take kindly to being hauled into U.S.
courts, particularly when the plaintiff is a U.S. citizen. Foreign
defendants believe that U.S. courts favor U.S. litigants.221 American
courts apply U.S. choice of law rules and decide cases with U.S.
judges, in a manner that has the appearance, if not the reality, of
promoting U.S. interests.22 Similarly, as much as plaintiffs may
finding that the U.S. law offers plaintiffs the greatest advantages).
219. David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England:
"A Rather FantasticFiction," 103 LAW. Q. REV. 398, 418-20 (1987) (discussing
survey suggesting that plaintiffs ousted from U.S. courts do not regularly
pursue remedies elsewhere); see also Weintraub, supra note 217, at 322
(arguing that with "few exceptions, a lawyer anywhere in the world
representing a client with a claim for a serious injury or death, who does not
explore the feasibility of bringing suit in the United States, is guilty of
malpractice" (footnote omitted)).
220. Smith, Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch, (1983) 2 All E.R. 72, 74
(C.A. Civ. Div. 1982) (Denning, J.); see also Castanho v. Brown & Root (U.K.)
Ltd., (1980) 1 W.L.R. 833, 849 (C.A. Civ. Div. 1980), affd, (1981) A.C. 557 (H.L.
1980) (Denning, J.) ("A Texas-style claim is big business."); cf. John S. Willems,
Shutting the U.S. Courthouse Door?: Forum Non Conveniens in International
Arbitration, DISp. RESOL. J., Aug./Oct. 2003, at 54, 56 ("Litigants are attracted
to the high quality of U.S. courts, the willingness of U.S. courts to exercise
jurisdiction over international disputes, and, rightly or wrongly, the belief that
U.S. courts are ready to award large sums of damages.").
221. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American
Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1121-22, 1143 (1996) (exploring reasons why
foreigners fear U.S. courts but concluding, based on empirical data, that foreign
litigants do not fare badly in U.S. litigation); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Why
Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and Modern Justifications for
FederalJurisdiction Over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 1,
35 (1996) (discussing current bias against foreign citizens); Elmer J. Stone &
Kenneth H. Slade, Special Considerations in International Licensing
Agreements, 1 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 161, 169 (1988) (explaining that U.S. and
foreign parties both fear discrimination in each other's respective court systems
and prefer arbitration as a "more impartial and neutral way to resolve
disputes"). See generally Hartwin Bungert, Equal Protection for Foreign and
Alien Corporations: Towards Intermediate Scrutiny for a Quasi-Suspect
Classification, 59 Mo. L. REV. 569 (1994) (arguing that a history of
discrimination against foreign corporations in the U.S. justifies heightened
scrutiny of regulation of foreign corporations).
222. Christopher L. Doerksen, The Restatement of Canada's Cuban
(American) Problem, 61 SASKATCHEWAN L. REV. 127, 134-35 (1998) ("Canada
believes that a judge raised within the cultural construct of the United States
will necessarily tend to favor U.S. interests . . . ."); Posch, supra note 214, at 374
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often prefer U.S. discovery rules, alien defendants perceive those
unfamiliar
rules as free-wheeling,
unsupervised
"fishing
expeditions."223 For alien defendants, international lawsuits brought
in the U.S. "are expensive, difficult to investigate and defend, and
legally complex." 224 The host of complaints foreigners make as to
U.S. civil litigation include complaints about: "juries, discovery,
class actions, contingent fees, and often substantive American law,
which is perceived as pro-plaintiff and selected under similar proplaintiff choice of law rules."2 25 In short, foreign defendants are
rightfully concerned that plaintiffs may forum shop for favorable
(explaining that "U.S. lay judges may not always be impartial if they have to
deliver a verdict in a case where the interests of a U.S. party and a European
party are in conflict" and that "[flor Europeans, it is common belief that a
member of a U.S. jury, even if carefully selected, will usually be inclined to
sympathize with the U.S. plaintiffs rather than with the foreign defendants").
This concern of bias existed between state citizens in the early formation of the
United States. See Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87
(1809) (emphasizing the need for federal diversity jurisdiction to avoid actual
prejudice to out-of-state litigants, and to eliminate fear of prejudice, whether
justified or not); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 475-76 (1793)
(stating that disputes between citizens of different states should be resolved in
federal court because of "the danger of irritation and criminations arising from
apprehensions and suspicions of partiality"). "As James Madison said of the
state courts: 'We well know, sir, that foreigners cannot get justice done them in
these courts . .

.'"
JONATHAN ELLIOT,
ADOPTION OF THE

1876)).
223.

Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 221, at 1121 (citing 3
THE DEBATE IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 583 (Philadelphia, Lippincott 2d ed.

BORN,supra note

71, at 848 (internal citation omitted); see also Richard

M. Dunn & Raquel M. Gonzalez, The Thing About Non-U.S. Discovery for U.S.
Litigation: It's Expensive and Complex, 67 DEF. COUNS. J. 342, 342, 346-47

(2000) (noting that "[als evidenced by some of the discovery blocking statutes in
[civil law] nations, there is widespread distaste for American-style pretrial
discovery" and discussing blocking statutes).
224. Doyle & Ponton, supra note 211, at 295; see also id. at 294 (noting the
attraction of plaintiffs to litigating "the very worst foreign accidents" in U.S.
court venues).
225. Linda Silberman, Comparative Jurisdiction in the International
Context: Will the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention be Stalled?, 52
DEPAUL L. REV. 319, 320 (2002); see also Posch, supra note 214, at 372-74

(discussing European dislike of American legal fee structure and right to jury
trial); Peter D. Trooboff, Ten (and ProbablyMore) Difficulties in Negotiating a
Worldwide Convention on International Jurisdiction and Enforcement of
Judgments: Some Initial Lessons, in A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND

267 (John J. Barcelo & Kevin M.
Clermont eds., 2002) (noting that "United States judgments are feared in the
rest of the world" and that there exists "genuine concern over the assertion of
jurisdiction by United States courts because of the size of the awards that juries
in the United States are believed to grant in civil litigation").
JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE
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law in the United States, 226 or otherwise impose greater costs upon
them.22 7
U.S. jurisdictional rules, however, impact more than just
individual defendants.
Extraterritorial jurisdictional assertions
"can affect United States foreign relations in ways that domestic
claims of jurisdiction cannot."22
An exorbitant jurisdictional
assertion, or at least the appearance of it, "can readily arouse
foreign resentment," "provoke diplomatic protests," "trigger
commercial or judicial retaliation, and threaten friendly relations in
unrelated fields." 229

The impact can be profound: "[E]xhorbitant

jurisdictional claims can frustrate diplomatic initiatives by the
United States, particularly in the private international law field.
Most significantly, these claims can interfere with U.S. efforts to
conclude international agreements providing for mutual recognition
and enforcement of judgments or restricting exorbitant
jurisdictional claims by foreign states."2 ° In many ways, broad
226. Juenger, supra note 217, at 554-56 (explaining how exorbitant
jurisdictional practices in the United States provide an incentive to forum
shop).
227. Rutherglen, supra note 40, at 372 ("Choosing between national legal
systems creates greater risks... to impose costs upon the defendant.").
228. Born, supra note 5, at 28; see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 115-16 (1987) (noting that the assertion of personal
jurisdiction in California over a Japanese corporation might cause a strain in
foreign relations); George Monro, Ltd. v. Am. Cynamid & Chem. Corp., K.B.
432, 437 (1944) ("Service out of the jurisdiction at the instance of our courts is
necessarily prima facie an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the
sovereignty of the foreign country where service is to be effected.").
229. Born, supra note 5, at 28-29; see Bassett, Implied "Consent",supra note
216 at 634 ("[A]mong the practical reasons commanding a closer evaluation of
the assertion of personal jurisdiction over foreign claimants is the potential
impact on foreign relations.
Carelessness and overreaching in asserting
jurisdiction over foreign citizens may cause offense or resentment in foreign
countries." (footnote omitted)); cf Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International
Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 457, 472 (2001) (describing how

human rights litigation in the U.S. under the Alien Tort Statute can often cause
"foreign relations damage"); David Wille, Personal Jurisdiction and the
Internet-ProposedLimits on State Jurisdictionover Data Communications in
Tort Cases, 87 KY. L.J. 95, 98 (1998) ("[T]he Internet is international in scope
and questions of personal jurisdiction are likely to be even more problematic
when countries with heterogeneous legal systems and jurisdictional approaches
are thrown into the mix. Jurisdiction in that context also raises problems in
foreign relations."); Ellencrig, supra note 162, at 368-69 (noting the need for
uniformity in personal jurisdiction law "because of the implications of foreign
relations").
230. Born, supra note 5, at 29; see also LEA BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 289 (1986). Brilmayer states:
The resolution of [conflicts with an international component] is a
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assertions of jurisdiction raise the same concerns for international
relations that the extraterritorial application of law does. 3 1
Not only can foreign relations be impacted when a U.S. court
entertains claims against a foreigner, but U.S. trade relations can be
particularly harmed as well.232 The U.S. Solicitor General has
argued that broad jurisdictional assertions would have "a
'significant potential for discouraging foreign forums from
purchasing American products' and 'would thwart positive efforts of
Congress and the Executive Branch to make American firms and
products more competitive internationally.'

33

Little doubt exists

that "in a globalized economy[,] differences between domestic rules
governing jurisdictional issues and the recognition of foreign
judgments may hamper the functioning of international trade and
commerce."2 34 The refusal of foreign courts to recognize judgments
because of U.S. jurisdictional rules, also "seriously damages the
competitiveness of U.S. manufacturers" as "foreign manufacturers
can discount the collectibility" of U.S. judgments.2 35
particularly delicate matter because the confrontation between laws
and policies of the United States and foreign states are often sharper
and more complex than any analogous showdown between two states.
Simply put, overly aggressive adjudication can disrupt commerce and
peace between nations much more than it can between States.

Id.
231. See generally Mark P. Gibney, The ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S.
Law: The Perversion of Democratic Governance, the Reversal of Institutional
Roles, and the Imperative of EstablishingNormative Principles, 19 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 297, 312-13 (1996) (discussing negative impacts extraterritorial

application of law may have).
232. Born, supra note 5, at 30-31; Paretzky, supra note 212, at 677; see also
Diana K. Tani, Note, Specific Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporate
Defendants, 10 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 361, 386-89 (1988) (explaining how

jurisdictional rules impact foreign trade).
233. Silberman, supra note 24, at 507 (quoting ANDREAS F.

LOWENFELD,
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 175-76 (1993) (citing Brief for the

United States as Amicus Curiae, at 9-12, Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia

v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (No. 82-1127))); cf.The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972), superseded by federal statute (recognizing in a related
context that "[tihe expansion of American business and industry will hardly be
encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial
concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts").
234. Posch, supra note 214, at 363-64.
235. George L. Priest, Lawyers, Liability, and Law Reform: Effects on
American Economic Growth and Trade Competitiveness, 71 DENV. U. L. REV.
115, 147-49 (1993) (explaining how a German's court's refusal to enforce an
American punitive damages judgment "implicat[es] . . . U.S. trade
competitiveness and national wealth"); see also J. Noelle Hicks, Facilitating
International Trade: The U.S. Needs Federal Legislation Governing the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 155, 178 (2002)
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Related to the concern that jurisdictional rules impact foreign
relations and trade is the concern over retaliatory practices. Some
nations have enacted statutes that authorize their courts to exercise
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant whenever the defendant's
nation would do the same in analogous situations.236 Retaliation is
particularly likely when a U.S. court provides a forum for a foreign
plaintiff injured in his or her home nation. Permitting courts to
exercise jurisdiction in these circumstances undercuts foreign
nations' policies. "This is so because nations balance many factors
in deciding on a trade policy, and the results of this balancing are
reflected in the rules of decision that they adopt to govern tort
recoveries in their courts."237
A good example of how jurisdictional assertions can impact
foreign and diplomatic relations is the contentious Trail Smelter
case, currently pending before the Ninth Circuit.238 In that case, a
federal court in Washington State exercised jurisdiction over a
Canadian smelting company operating solely in Canada
-.
239 for alleged
environmental damage occurring in the United States.
Although
the district court's decision to assert personal jurisdiction under the
effects test is faithful to current personal jurisdiction law, 4 ° Canada
believes that, by permitting the case to go forward, the U.S. court is
undermining Canadian environmental policies and infringing on
Canadian sovereignty.24 '
The defendant has summed up the
Canadian reaction to the U.S. court accepting jurisdiction well:
"Canada sets its own environmental agenda, sets its own
environmental standards, has its own body of laws that applies to
both the regulation of operators like Trail and any remedial
obligations associated with those operations, and it doesn't need any
(arguing that valid U.S. judgments need to be enforced in foreign courts to
"facilitate the expansion of foreign trade").
236. Born, supra note 5, at 15, 22, 33 n.139; see also BORN, supra note 71, at
93 ("[A] state court's assertion of judicial jurisdiction over residents of another
U.S. state virtually never provokes retaliatory measures; in contrast, assertions
over foreign defendants can result in retaliation from foreign nations."); Perdue,
supra note 26, at 464-65 (describing French, Belgian, and European Union
retaliatory practices).
237. Paretzky, supra note 212, at 680.
238. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-AAM, 2004 WL
2578982, 35 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,083 (E.D. Wash. Nov 8, 2004). See generally
Austen L. Parrish, Trail Smelter D~jd Vu: Extraterritoriality,International
Environmental Law, and the Search for Solutions to Canadian-U.S.
TransboundaryWater Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U. L. REV. 363 (2005) (describing
pending litigation in detail).
239. Parrish, supra note 238, at 376-80.
240. Id. at 387-92.
241. Id. at 402-06.
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help from the United States."242 The case has received significant
attention and has become a crisis in U.S.-Canadian diplomatic
relations.243
2.

Judgment Enforcement: Jurisdiction'sCollateralEffects

Jurisdictional issues are also important because of the status of
judgment recognition in other countries. For some, like Canada and
the United Kingdom, courts increasingly recognize and enforce U.S.
judgments without reexamining the case's merits.
But most
24
countries resist enforcing U.S. judgments. " The United States is
currently not a party to any bilateral judgments convention.246 And
242. Id. at 407 (footnote omitted).

See generally Arthur T. Downey,

ExtraterritorialSanctions in the Canada/ U.S. Context-A U.S. Perspective, 24

CAN.-U.S. L.J. 215, 215 (1998) (explaining how "Canada sometimes suffers
nightmares about the firmness and durability of its own sovereignty. It
naturally bristles when the ugly head of extraterritoriality appears, especially if
it is an American head").
243. Parrish, supra note 238, at 369-85; see also Neil Craik, Return to Trail:
Unilateralismand the Limits of ExtraterritorialJurisdiction:The Second Trail
Smelter Dispute, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS
FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION (Rebecca Bratspies & Russell Millers

eds., forthcoming 2006).
244. See Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial is Our Need for a
Judgments-Recognition Convention and What Should We BargainAway to Get

It?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 167, 178-84 (1998) (describing the recognition of U.S.
judgments abroad in Canada, Italy, China, the U.K., Germany, Austria, the
Netherlands, Norway, and Brazil). For a discussion ofjudgment enforcement in
the United Kingdom, see generally COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN & COMPARATIVE LAW
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SURVEY ON FOREIGN
RECOGNITION OF U.S. MONEY JUDGMENTS 3-4 (July 31, 2001), available at

http://www.brownwelsh.com/archive/ABCNYstudy-enforcing-judgments.pdf
("In general, U.S. judgment creditors experience little apparent difficulty in
enforcing judgments in England."). For a discussion of judgment enforcement
in Canada, see Parrish, supra note 238, at 399-402; see also Joost Blom, The
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Morguard Goes Forth into the World, 28

CAN. BUS. L.J. 373, 373-80 (1997) (explaining that "[als far as the Canadian law
on the enforcement of foreign judgments is concerned, the world, in a literal
sense, changed in 1990 with the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in
Morguard" and the subsequent wide recognition of U.S. judgments); Janet
Walker, The Great CanadianComity Experiment Continues, 120 L.Q. REV. 365-

69 (2004) (describing and criticizing Canada's continuing enforcement and
deference to foreign judgments); Kate M.K. Matthews, Comment, The Recent
Trend of CanadianEnforcement of United States Judgments and the Future of
the Trend Under a Proposed Private InternationalLaw Treaty, 19 J.L. & COM.

309, 310-14 (2000) (discussing Canadian court recognition of U.S. judgments).
245. Silberman, supra note 225, at 321.
246. Id.; see also BORN, supra note 71, at 89 ("The United States is party to

virtually no treaties dealing even indirectly with judicial jurisdiction."); Strauss,
supra note 84, at 376 n.11 ("The United States has not entered into any
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foreign defendants often "have only minimal assets within the forum
state."247 The result is that even if a court exercises jurisdiction over
may face significant difficulties in
a foreign defendant, a plaintiff
248
collecting any judgment.
The reluctance of other nations to recognize U.S. judgments is
inextricably tied to how U.S. courts exercise personal jurisdiction.
Judgments are generally enforced as a matter of comity 249 and
bilateral treaties that comprehensively allocate the authority to exercise
personal jurisdiction in international civil cases, but it has entered into a
number of 'friendship, commerce and navigation treaties' that have
jurisdictional implications."). For a discussion of the unsuccessful attempt to
create a multilateral judgments convention, see generally JOHN J. BARCELO III
& KEVIN M. CLERMONT, EDS., A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS:
LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE (2002).

247. BORN, supra note 71, at 93.
248. Degnan & Kane, supra note 15, at 844-48 (describing the difficulties of
enforcing judgments against alien defendants abroad); Friedrich Juenger,
Judicial Jurisdictionin the United States and in the European Communities: A
Comparison, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1205 (1984) (describing the difficulties in
judgment enforcement against aliens and explaining that "pursuant to the laws
of several European nations, jurisdiction is largely controlled by the law of the
jungle, and unfortunately their [judgment] recognition practices are as narrow
as their jurisdictional assertions are broad, except to the extent that treaties
afford relief"); Lilly, supra note 5, at 118 ("Even if the American plaintiff
successfully prosecutes an action in the United States against an alien, he may
have difficulty securing the fruits of his victory. Nations uniformly deny the
direct enforcement of foreign judgments." (footnotes omitted)). See generally
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR
REASONABLENESS: ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw, 109-36 (1996)
(discussing recognition and enforcement of U.S. judgments abroad). For an
older analysis of the problem of foreign judgment enforcement, see Beverly May
Carl, Recognition of Texas Judgments in Courts of Foreign Nations---and Vice
Versa, 13 Hous. L. REV. 680, 686-87 (1976).
249. See generally Molly Warner Lien, The Cooperative and Integrative
Models of InternationalJudicial Comity: Two Illustrations Using Transnational
Discovery and Breard Scenarios, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 591 (2001) (describing the
use of comity); Brian Pearce, Note, The Comity Doctrine as a Barrierto Judicial
Jurisdiction: A U.S.-E.U. Comparison, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 525 (1994)
(discussing the "Comity Doctrine" and comparing U.S. and E.U. approaches to
jurisdiction in international civil litigation). Courts have broadly defined
comity. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) ("The extent to
which the law of one nation ... whether by executive order, by legislative act, or
by judicial decree, shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another
nation, depends upon what our greatest jurists have been content to call 'the
comity of nations.'"); cf Harold G. Maier, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction at a
Crossroads:An Intersection Between Public and Private InternationalLaw, 76
AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 281 (1982) (describing comity as "an amorphous never-never
land whose borders are marked by fuzzy lines of politics, courtesy, and good
faith"); Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 77
(1991) (arguing that comity operates outside domestic and international law
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"respect for the sovereign power of the rendering state."25 ° No
uniform practice exists among foreign states regarding the
recognition and enforcement of U.S. judgments.251
Normally,
however, a nation will only enforce a judgment if the enforcing court
determines that the U.S. court properly exercised jurisdiction. 252 As
a practical matter, U.S. jurisdictional rules are different and are
perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be inappropriately broader than
those of most civil law countries.253 Most nations permit jurisdiction
on the basis of the defendant's domicile, as well "as on the basis of
transnationally related events occurring in the forum.,

254

Most

nations do not recognize, however, "doing business" jurisdiction,
which permits assertion of jurisdiction based on a defendant's offices
or substantial activity within a forum even when the claim is
unrelated to those activities. 25 5 Also "noticeably absent from the
jurisdictional rules of many countries is the requirement of
purposeful availment."256 Likewise, the rest of the world generally

parameters).
250. Degnan & Kane, supra note 15, at 847.
251. BORN, supra note 71, at 942-43 (noting the lack of uniform practice and
providing examples from Germany, Japan and England); NANDA & PANSIUS,
supra note 84, at 204-49 (surveying the requirements for recognition and
enforcement of U.S. judgments in foreign courts).
252. LOWENFELD, supra note 248, at 122 ("It goes without saying that no
legal system would regard an in personam judgment rendered by a foreign
forum binding on a party over whom that forum did not have jurisdiction.");
Friedrich K. Juenger, The Recognition of Money Judgments in Civil and

Commercial Matters, 36 Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 13 (1988) (surveying twenty-one
countries and finding that all but one "exercise some form of review of the
rendition state's jurisdiction"); Strauss, supra note 84, at 419 ("Courts will,
however, typically refuse to execute such foreign judgments if they consider the
foreign court to have exorbitantly asserted jurisdiction in the underlying case.").
253. Silberman, supra note 225, at 322 (arguing that U.S. assertions of
jurisdiction are often actually narrower than other those of other nations).
Linda Silberman, in several articles, has noted in that "in many respects [rules
of jurisdiction in the United States are] actually more restrictive than rules of
jurisdiction in Europe." Silberman, supra note 215, at 329; see also Silberman,
supra note 210, at 395.
254. Perdue, supra note 26, at 462 (footnote omitted); see also Heiser, supra
note 72, at 1037 ("General jurisdiction is particularly controversial in
international litigation involving foreign defendants who do business in the
United States.").
255. Silberman, supra note 215, at 333-39; see also Patrick J. Borchers, The
Problem with General Jurisdiction,2001 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 119, 137 (discussing
"doing business" jurisdiction); Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business
with Doing-Business Jurisdiction,2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 190-93 (surveying
recent cases on general jurisdiction with foreign nation defendants).
256. Perdue, supra note 26, at 462.
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.251

characterizes "tag" or transient jurisdiction as exorbitant.
Accordingly, other nations often do not recognize U.S. judgments
because they
believe
U.S. courts improperly assert jurisdiction on
-2581
suspect bases.
The impact of other nations' judgment enforcement practices
are therefore two-fold. For those countries that do not recognize
U.S. judgments because of what is perceived to be broad
jurisdictional principles, the United States has placed itself in a
comparative disadvantage. The United States is one of the most
hospitable countries to foreign judgments. 2 9 The imbalance was
important enough that the U.S. State Department and the American
Law Institute for years attempted to solve the problem through
treaty negotiation.2 ° Second, U.S. jurisdictional rules have made it
nearly impossible to negotiate an international judgments treaty.
The recent failure of the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and
Satisfaction of Judgments was largely attributable to the confusion
existing in U.S. jurisdictional rules.
Certainly, jurisdictional
257. Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an InternationalJudicialSystem, 56 STAN.
L. REV. 429, 511-12 (2003); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 421(2)(a) (1986) (rejecting tag jurisdiction); Peter
Hay, Transient Jurisdiction,Especially Over International Defendants: Critical
Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV.
593, 602 ("[An exercise of 'general jurisdiction' over a transient foreigner is
simply exorbitant with respect to international defendants."); Kathryn A.
Russell, Exorbitant Jurisdictionand Enforcement of Judgments: The Brussels
System as an Impetus for United States Action, 19 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM.
57, 85-86 (1993) (describing how European nations find "tag" jurisdiction to be
exorbitant and that the "United States has stubbornly refused to give [it] up");
Wolfgang Wurmnest, Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. Money Judgments in
Germany, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 175, 190-91 (2005) (explaining how "tag"
jurisdiction is seen as exorbitant and not recognized in Germany).
258. Silberman, supra note 226, at 321, 331; see also Silberman, supra note
24, at 503 ("Given the perception of other countries that both the adjudicative
and legislative jurisdictional reach of the United State is often excessive, they
may not enforce and recognize United States judgments.").
259. LOWENFELD, supra note 248, at 129; see also Posch, supra note 214, at
365 (explaining that "[firom the U.S. perspective" an important goal of the
Hague Judgment's Convention "was the facilitation of the enforcement of
decisions of U.S. courts abroad, particularly in Europe, since the enforcement of
decisions rendered by European courts is easier in most U.S. jurisdictions and
does not depend on the requirement of reciprocity as it does in the majority of
European States").
260. See supra note 20.
261. Posch, supra note 214, at 365 ("Europeans were particularly opposed to
the ongoing U.S. practice of recognizing merely 'doing business in an American
State' as a sufficient basis for exercising U.S. jurisdiction."); Rutherglen, supra
note 40, at 372-73 (explaining how jurisdictional issues make agreement on an
international judgments treaty difficult); Weintraub, supra note 244, at 187
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confusion reduces U.S. negotiators' room for bargaining, and
"deference to the [U.S. Supreme] Court's authority
is bound to
2 62
inhibit concessions to common sense and practicality."
B.

Suggested Frameworksfor Analysis

Personal jurisdiction over alien defendants is doctrinally
confused in light of the current approach to U.S. constitutionalism.
Foreign defendants have numerous reasons to resent being hauled
into a U.S. court. And our current jurisdictional law places the
United States at a distinct disadvantage given other nations'
unwillingness to enforce U.S. judgments as a result of that law. But
does it have to be this way?
A complete description of a
comprehensive set of jurisdictional rules is beyond the scope of this
Article (if not any article), but two broad possibilities suggest
themselves. Both would enable the courts to rejuvenate personal
jurisdiction law in the alien defendant context and reclaim doctrinal
consistency. The first would impose only modest changes to the
minimum contacts doctrine but would serve no more than as a
partial fix. The second-a bolder, but doctrinally and pragmatically
personal
preferable
approach-would
deconstitutionalize
jurisdiction when the defendant is a nonresident alien.
1.

Adjusting Current Law

The first approach assumes that the U.S. Supreme Court may
be disinclined to dramatically change the minimum contacts test
and treat nonresident alien defendants differently. Under this
approach, due process's continued dominance as the only limit on a
court's exercise of jurisdiction is assumed.263 If these assumptions
are correct, at least two adjustments are needed to current doctrine:
one theoretical, one practical. Notably, this approach would not
solve the deep-rooted problems present in the U.S. jurisdictional
rules, but would be a first, small step in the right direction.
From a theoretical or doctrinal perspective, the Court must stop
its trend in focusing on an individual's liberty interest, when the
case involves a nonresident, alien defendant. In the international
context, even if personal jurisdiction remains connected to the Due
(describing how U.S. jurisdictional law makes it difficult for U.S. negotiators to
obtain agreement on a judgment convention).
262. Juenger, supra note 84, at 1043. See generally Joachim Zekoll, The
Role and Status of American Law in the Hague Judgments Convention Project,
61 ALB. L. REv. 1283 (1988) (explaining, from a European perspective,
objections to U.S. jurisdictional rules).
263. Silberman, supra note 68, at 766 (taking that position that "[o]bviously,
the Supreme Court is not going to unravel its long history of constitutional
jurisdiction jurisprudence," but that "some shift is possible").
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Process Clause, the jurisdictional calculus must be understood
primarily to focus on and encapsulate concerns for comity and
nation-state sovereignty. As described above, although it may well
be the nature of our federalism that interstate sovereignty concerns
are no longer relevant, sovereignty remains the key constraint on
jurisdiction internationally.264
Put simply, while jurisdictional
assertions within the United States may be unlikely to create state
jealousies, those jealousies can and do arise in the international
265
context.
In this regard, the Court should reject the scholarly
urgings of Martin Redish, John Drobak, Russell Weintraub, and
others who suggest that personal jurisdiction restrictions are only a
matter of individual liberty. 266 Regardless of that scholarship's
merit, it is inapplicable when the defendant is foreign.
The
prerogatives of States are what constrain jurisdiction over alien
defendants.
Practically, the change would come in how courts apply the fair
play and substantial justice factors.
Convenience and the
defendant's burden should play little to no role in the jurisdictional
analysis when the defendant is foreign, while state interests must
play a greater role.
Courts should refrain from making
jurisdictional decisions based on the closeness of the foreigner to the
forum state, or the availability of modern communications, or other
superficial
considerations such as the availability of discount plane
t.
_. 267
tickets.
Instead, the fair play and substantial justice factors, set
forth in Asahi, should determine whether jurisdiction would be
reasonable as that term is understood under international
principles.266 Under this approach, courts would take much more to
heart Asahi's cautions that international cases raise unique
concerns. Special care would be given to ensure that jurisdiction is
not exercised when the case implicates foreign relations. 269 The
264. See supra Part III.B.
265. For a discussing of the origins of jurisdiction in the early constitutional
period, see Weinstein, supra note 3, at 198 (noting that jurisdictional rules were
intended, in part, to "bind several independent states into a coherent,
cooperative nation").
266. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
267. See supra Part II.C.1.
268. LOWENFELD, supra note 248, at 228-30; Silberman, supra note 68, at
760; see also supra note 210.
269. Sound policy reasons exist for this, aside from the jurisdictional issue.
Courts are not well suited to dealing with cases that implicate foreign relations.
See Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in ForeignRelations, 83 AM.
J. INT'L L. 821, 830 (1989) (discussing the dormant foreign commerce clause and
noting the inappropriateness of federal courts deciding foreign affairs issues);
Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L.

REV. 1617, 1668 (1997) (explaining why courts are poorly equipped to deal with
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immediate effect would be that courts would exercise jurisdiction in
fewer instances, even when minimum contacts are met.
To the extent a foreign defendant's burden or inconvenience is
accounted for, it should weigh against asserting jurisdiction when
the case is likely to involve significant substantive or procedural
differences unique to U.S. litigation.
Generally, however,
convenience concerns should be addressed solely at the subconstitutional level utilizing venue and forum non conveniens.27 °
2.

A Bolder Approach

A bolder, yet doctrinally and pragmatically preferable, approach
would be to decouple the personal jurisdiction analysis from the
Constitution altogether. This does not mean that as a nation we
should turn back to Pennoyer's overly formalistic rules.27' Instead,
what courts must do is appreciate the concept of reciprocity between
sovereigns and understand the comparative standards for exercising
jurisdiction in foreign legal systems. 272

Like in the pre-Pennoyer

days, notions of comity and the sovereign rights of foreign states, or
other legislatively created restrictions, would limit jurisdiction.2 3
As a matter of policy, the decoupling of personal jurisdiction
from due process would be sensible. Several commentators have
explained the policy benefits of deconstitutionalizing personal
jurisdiction law, and there is no reason to rehash them here. 274 At
questions involving foreign relations); John Yoo, Federal Courts as Weapons of
Foreign Policy: The Case of the Helms-Burton Act, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 747, 763-75 (1997) (explaining why courts should not implement foreign
policy).
270. For recent advocacy of this approach, see Perdue, supra note 26, at 468.
271. Borchers, supra note 27, at 125 (describing problems with doctrine
developed from Pennoyer as both underinclusive and overinclusive);
Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum
Shopping and Outcome DeterminationUnder International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 769, 782-86 (1995) (describing the need for predictability and flexibility
as a result of the problems Pennoyer caused); von Mehren, supra note 58, at
300-07 (discussing constraints and problems that Pennoyer's power theory
created and the move to a theory of fairness).
272. Rutherglen, supra note 40, at 368.
273. Conison, supra note 31, at 1205-07 (describing the comity based
approach to jurisdiction); Perdue, supra note 26, at 461 (arguing based on
international law that the constraints on "U.S. exercises of sovereign judicial
authority" should "be very modest"); cf Albert A. Ehrenzweig, From State
Jurisdiction to Interstate Venue, 50 OR. L. REV. 103, 109 (1971) (positing that
venue and comity should govern jurisdictional questions). See generally
Strauss, supra note 24 (discussing the international law approach to personal
jurisdiction).
274. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 23, at 87-96 (explaining the benefits of
ending due process as a limitation on personal jurisdiction); Borchers, supra
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the very least, "we should pause before concluding that our
government is constitutionally disabled from asserting jurisdiction
over foreigners under circumstances in which other countries
consider it entirely appropriate." 275

Moreover, it would allow the

United States to approach jurisdictional rules pragmatically,
"unencumbered by the theoretical musings that dominate the
American jurisdictional landscape."27 6 The only limits imposed
would be those broad ones of international law to respect
• -J
277 foreign
state interests: interests that many cases will not implicate.
Because the jurisdictional limits sovereignty imposes are
meager, in a deconstitutionalized personal jurisdiction world,
legislative choices, in the form of a treaty, would be necessary to
sensibly regulate jurisdiction.278 Personal jurisdiction cannot be a
"free-for-all, unregulated phenomenon," and this Article does not
suggest otherwise. 27 9 The deconstitutionalizing of jurisdiction would,

therefore, presumably refresh the need to reach agreement on a
multilateral judgments treaty. Such a treaty would yield significant
benefits:
A treaty would rationalize the U.S. law of jurisdiction and
judgments on the international level, while moving the world
toward justice without regard to international boundaries.
Moreover, a treaty would give the United States the
opportunity to untangle its jurisdictional law applied at home.
That is, rethinking jurisdiction in the course of the
treatymaking process could result in improvements on the
interstate level

280

note 27, at 154-56 (same).
275. Perdue, supra note 26, at 470.
276. Borchers, supra note 27, at 122.
277. Conison, supra note 31, at 1104-13; Strauss, supra note 24, at 1263-67;
Strauss, supra note 84, at 416-23.
278. To adopt an international treaty of jurisdiction would be consistent
with what many scholars have urged. As George Rutherglen has compellingly
argued, the realist scholars who have embraced the jurisdictional principles
articulated in International Shoe, called "for particularized rules to be
developed either through legislation or through case law." Rutherglen, supra
note 40, at 350, 359-61 (citing Hazard, supra note 40, at 241); id. at 371
(explaining that International Shoe "promised to foster the development of
other, more concrete rules of decision").
279. Borchers, supranote 23, at 101.
280. Kevin M. Clermont & Kuo-Chang Huang, Converting the Draft Hague
Treaty into Domestic JurisdictionalLaw, in A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND
JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 192 (John J. Barcel6 III & Kevin M.

Clermont eds., 2002); see also Borchers, supra note 27, at 123 (arguing that if
jurisdictional norms could be developed legislatively the United States would
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The ability to reach agreement on an international treaty would be
enhanced, as constitutional doctrine would not unnecessarily and
artificially constrain U.S. negotiators. 8 '
Untethering personal jurisdiction analysis from the Due Process
Clause, when the case involves alien defendants, is not as radical as
might be first thought. Those scholars who have urged the Supreme
Court to stop speaking of personal jurisdiction in constitutional
terms282 face a significant hurdle: well over a hundred years of
consistent precedent-since Pennoyer in 1877-holding that
jurisdictional principles are constitutionally derived.2 3
But
comparatively, no long-held precedent exists when the case involves
nonresident aliens. The Supreme Court has only decided four
personal jurisdiction cases involving foreign defendants. 2 In none
of these cases was the issue directly addressed or even litigated.
And the cases the Court has decided could easily be limited to their
unique facts.
Other reasons exist to believe that in its next decision, the
Court could well choose to change the analysis. First, in Burnham,
the Court demonstrated its willingness to veer from precedent to
arrive at what it believed to be a doctrinally and historically
consistent result. Justice Scalia argued that history, antedating the
Fourteenth Amendment, sanctioned transient jurisdiction, that
InternationalShoe adhered to "traditional notions" of jurisdiction,
and that nothing is more traditional that transient or "tag"
jurisdiction.28' International sovereignty principles have a similarly
impressive historical lineage and are certainly traditional in the
truest of senses. Second, in both InternationalShoe and Shaffer v.
Heitner, the Court was willing to reexamine jurisdictional precepts
and craft new, previously unapplied jurisdictional rules. As Justice
Brennan once explained, "[the court was] willing in Shaffer to
examine anew the appropriateness of the quasi-in-rem rule-until
that time dutifully accepted by American courts for at least a
century"286 And of course, long practice does not necessarily make
good law.287 Lastly, the Court itself seems to be well aware of the

benefit
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

greatly).
Borchers, supra note 27, at 122, 132.
See supra note 158.
Supra note 40 and accompanying text.
Supra note 121.
Supra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 1977).

287. Sir. EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND § 80 (17th ed. 1817) ("How long soever it hath continued, if it be

against reason, it is of no force in law.").
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shortcomings of its own jurisprudence,288 which bode well for change.
V.

CONCLUSION

The jurisdictional standards derived from the due process
clause have blithely been assumed to apply to foreign defendants.
No coherent explanation, however, exists for why nonresident, alien
defendants are entitled to constitutional protections in the
jurisdictional context. The current personal jurisdiction analysis,
which provides foreign defendant due process rights, is at odds with
the U.S. Supreme Court's broader approach to constitutionalism.
The contrast is particularly stark given the recent decisions
involving Guantdnamo Bay detainees that reaffirm that foreigners
outside United States control or territory have no constitutional
rights. The result is to shackle and unnecessarily constrain U.S.
courts with a constitutional jurisdictional standard, even when none
should apply.
When the U.S. Supreme Court faces its next personal
jurisdiction case, it may well have the opportunity to correct prior
missteps and clear up the personal jurisdiction standard. Rather
than blindly following doctrinally incoherent precedent, it would be
wise to acknowledge that the personal jurisdiction standard that
applies to nonresident aliens is different than the one that applies to
domestic defendants. Sovereignty, not due process, limits a U.S.
court's extraterritorial assertion of personal jurisdiction.

288. Juenger, supra note 84, at 1045; see, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court,
495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990) (White, J., concurring) (criticizing the fairness inquiry
for inviting "endless, fact-specific litigation"); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing how the
standards enunciated by InternationalShoe may already be obsolete); Shaffer,
433 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring) (referring to the "uncertainty of the
general InternationalShoe standard).

